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INTRODUCTION
During the last several decades, international athletes’ presence
in professional American sports has reached unprecedented levels.
Not all premier professional American sports leagues, however,
accommodate internationalization to the same extent. While the
National Football League (“NFL”), the National Hockey League
(“NHL”), the National Basketball Association (“NBA”), and
Major League Baseball (“MLB”) do not impose limits on
international entrants into their leagues, Major League Soccer
(“MLS”) does. Under a policy established at the league’s founding
in 1996 (the “MLS Policy” or the “Policy”), no MLS team may
stock its 18-person senior roster with any more than eight
international players.1
From the very beginning, therefore, MLS was designed to
exclude. This, in some respects, renders MLS not unlike its sister
leagues, all of which have historically discriminated. These other
leagues’ discriminatory policies, however, precluded based on race
rather than citizenship status and have long since lapsed. The
NFL, which was founded in 1920,2 expurgated blacks in 1934, but
reintegrated twelve years later, in 1946.3 The American League
and the National League, the two leagues comprising MLB, also
included blacks initially and later barred them.4 They, however,
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1
See MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER, 2008 MLS PLAYER RULES & REGULATIONS,
available
at
http://web.mlsnet.com/about/league.jsp?section=regulations&content=overview
(last visited Feb. 1, 2009). See text accompanying footnotes 12-14 for
discussion of the distinction between MLS’ ‘international’ players and its
‘domestic’ players.
2
The NFL originally operated as the American Professional Football
Association, and in 1921 reorganized and changed its name to the American
Professional Football League. See PATRICK CLARK, SPORTS FIRSTS 37 (1981).
In 1922, it changed its name yet again, this time to the National Football
League. See NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, HISTORY, available at
http://www.nfl.com/history/chronology/1921-1930#1922 (last visited Feb. 1,
2009).
3
See ARTHUR R. ASHE, JR., A HARD ROAD TO GLORY: A HISTORY OF THE
AFRICAN-AMERICAN ATHLETE SINCE 1946 130 (1988).
4
See CLARK, supra note 2, at 12. Having been excluded from America’s
premier professional baseball leagues, black baseball players and enthusiasts
formed their own leagues. See ARTHUR R. ASHE, JR., A HARD ROAD TO GLORY:
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relaxed their bar in 1947, a year after the NFL did so.5 In 1950, the
NBA admitted its first black player,6 and eight years later, the NHL
did the same.7
So, when MLS began play in 1996, it became the first
American sports league in nearly half a century to, as a matter of
league-wide policy, openly discriminate in the construction of its
teams.8 Because, however, MLS’ discrimination is ostensibly
rooted in citizenship status rather than race, and because the
American legal system permits myriad forms of citizenship
discrimination, MLS’ discrimination has attracted little attention
and virtually no criticism. The absence of criticism is, however,
unfortunate.
A HISTORY OF THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN ATHLETE 1919-1945 27-30 (1988);
SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE: RACE AND SPORTS IN AMERICA 47 (1996).
These leagues, known collectively as the Negro Leagues, “were unique on the
American athletic landscape, providing successful alternative outlets for black
baseball players to display their talents.” N. Jeremi Duru, Fielding a Team for
the Fans: The Societal Consequences and Title VII Implications of Race
Considered Roster Construction in Professional Sport, 84 WASH. U. L. REV.
375, 383 (2006).
5
See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 4, at 29. Although, Kenny Washington and
Woody Strode reintegrated the NFL a year earlier, “[w]hen Jackie Robinson
[re]integrated Major League Baseball in 1947, that event was hailed as the
biggest civil rights success since the Civil War.” Id. at 19. Robinson’s MLB
debut likely received greater attention because professional baseball was at the
time substantially more popular among Americans than professional football,
see ASHE, supra note 3, at 128.
6
See HOWARD BRYANT, SHUT OUT: A STORY OF RACE AND BASEBALL IN
BOSTON 143 (2002); HARVEY ARATON & FILIP BONDY, THE SELLING OF THE
GREEN: THE FINANCIAL RISE AND MORAL DECLINE OF THE BOSTON CELTICS 5051 (1992). The NBA’s first black player was Chuck Cooper, drafted by the
Boston Celtics out of Duquesne University. See id. Later in the 1950 season,
the New York Knicks added to their roster Nat “Sweetwater” Clifton and the
Washington Capitols added Earl Lloyd. See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 4, at 31.
Notably, although Lloyd joined the NBA after Cooper, Lloyd was the first black
player to participate in an NBA game. See id.
7
See CLARK, supra note 2, at 69 (1981). The NHL’s first black player was
the Boston Bruins’ Willie O’Ree, who entered the NHL in 1958. See id.
8
Notably, although decades have passed since teams in the NFL, NHL,
NBA, and MLB engaged in overt racial discrimination, covert discrimination
continued well after the leagues initially integrated – or in the case of the NFL
and MLB, reintegrated. See ASHE, supra note 3, at 5. Indeed, reflecting on the
baseball context, Arthur Ashe, the tennis great and eminent sports historian
notes, “The period from Jackie Robinson’s debut in April 1947 to 1953 can best
be described as one of token integration. In this seven-year stretch, the National
League added blacks at the rate of three every two years; the American League
just one every two years. Some clubs would just not add any. . . . It took
fourteen years for the major leagues to become integrated.” Id. at 11. Even
once the leagues were fully “integrated,” as Ashe uses the term, many franchises
have persisted in considering race in their personnel hiring processes so as to
field teams palatable to the franchises’ fan bases. See generally, Duru, supra
note 4.

3

This article argues that the MLS Policy restricting the numbers
of international players on its teams’ rosters does, in fact,
perpetuate unlawful racial discrimination. While the Policy does
not facially discriminate against prospective players on the basis of
race, and while its drafters may not have intended racial exclusion,
the MLS Policy disproportionately and negatively impacts players
of color – particularly blacks and Latinos. In that the MLS Policy
serves to racially exclude in violation of federal anti-discrimination
law, it demands scrutiny. This article provides that scrutiny,
examines the implications the MLS Policy has for America’s other
premier professional sports leagues, and ultimately argues that
MLS should abandon the Policy.
Part I of this article explores the MLS Policy’s roots and the
circumstances ostensibly motivating its adoption.
Part II examines similar discriminatory policies implemented
by other nations’ soccer leagues and the ultimate legal invalidation
of those policies. This Part focuses principally on the European
Court of Justice’s groundbreaking disposition of Union Royale
Belge des Societes de Football Association ASBL (“URBSFA”) v.
Jean-Marc Bosman (the “Bosman case”), which rendered unlawful
international player restrictions in European nations’ domestic
soccer leagues.
Part III considers the form a Bosman-style challenge to the
MLS Policy would take under American law and assesses such a
challenge’s likelihood of success, concluding that the MLS Policy
would likely pass muster under both the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”) and the national origin
discrimination provision embedded in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).
Part IV considers the MLS Policy’s racially related
consequences and explores the Policy’s vulnerability on racial
discrimination grounds. Specifically, this Part examines Title
VII’s racial discrimination provision, and argues the Policy
constitutes either disparate treatment or disparate impact racial
discrimination in violation of federal anti-discrimination law.
Part V examines the MLS Policy in the context of premier
professional American sport, a context in which, as noted above, it
stands alone in its overt citizenship discrimination. Specifically,
this Part considers the NFL, in which international players are
exceedingly rare, the NHL, in which international players
predominate, and the NBA, in which the percentage of
international players increases year over year, noting that roster
internationalization in these leagues’ contexts, in contrast with the
MLS context, either maintains the leagues’ racial status quo or
increases the proportion of the leagues’ white players. In addition,
this Part considers the possibility that these differences in
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internationalization’s
impact
explain
why
roster
internationalization is seemingly deemed more palatable in the
NFL, the NHL and the NBA, where it is permitted, than in MLS,
where it is restricted.
Part VI explores the MLB context, in which
internationalization is producing the precise effect the MLS Policy
guards against – a “darkening” rather than a “lightening” of the
league – and queries whether, in response to internationalization’s
impact, MLB would or could join MLS in overt citizenship
discrimination.
Part VII concludes that the MLS Policy, whether or not
intended to do so, artificially suppresses the numbers of MLS’
players of color, frustrates the purposes of American antidiscrimination law, and, therefore, merits legal challenge.

I. THE MLS POLICY AND ITS ORIGINS
MLS began play in 1996 as a fledgling league with teams in
ten cities around the nation.9 During its thirteen year existence, the
League has significantly expanded and is now comprised of
fourteen teams – thirteen in the United States and one in Toronto,
Canada.10
While MLS shares many characteristics with America’s other
premier professional sports leagues, its commitment to
discriminating along citizenship lines, as noted above, starkly
differentiates it.11 MLS categorizes players into two groups –
domestic players and international players.12 MLS defines a
“domestic player” as “a U.S. citizen, a permanent resident (green
card holder) or the holder of other special status (e.g., has been
granted refugee or asylum status).”13 MLS defines all other
players as “international players.”14 Since its inception, MLS has
9

See Alex Yannis, Major League Soccer Gets Set for Unveilings, N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
17,
1995,
available
at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CEEDD1639F934A25753C
1A963958260 (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
10
See MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER: OVERVIEW, http://web.mlsnet.com/about/
(last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
11
Citizenship restrictions exist at the professional American minor league
level as well. See UNITED SOCCER LEAGUES, RULES AND REGULATIONS, 2008
SEASON, available at http://www.uslsoccer.com/aboutusl/rules/index_E.html.
(last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
12
See MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER, 2008 MLS PLAYER RULES &
REGULATIONS, supra note 1.
13
Once MLS placed a team in Toronto, it defined “domestic player”
differently in that context: “For Toronto FC, players with the legal right to work
in Canada are considered domestic players . . . .” Id.
14
See id.
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restricted the number of international players on a team, but has
placed no similar restriction on domestic players’ numbers.15
Initially, MLS prevented each of its teams from employing more
than four international players at any given time.16 Currently,
MLS mandates that each team’s eighteen person senior roster – the
roster of players with guaranteed contracts who are most likely to
represent the team in competition – contain no more than eight
international players.17
A. The NASL’s Rise and Fall
A brief historical exploration of American soccer is necessary
to fully understand the MLS Policy, its detriments, and MLS’
purported interests in effectuating it. The MLS Policy’s origin is
largely rooted in the demise of the North American Soccer League
(“NASL”). The NASL operated from 1968 through 1984 and
stands as the most successful and longest lasting professional
soccer league in American history.18 Ultimately, however, it
failed, hurdling from unprecedented success to extinction in just a
few years.19
Almost universally, commentators attribute the league’s
celeritous decline to its heavy international influence and the
financial toll attracting high-caliber international players took on
league teams.20 And, almost universally, they identify the onset of
the NASL “spending race” with the New York Cosmos’ decision
to, in 1975, sign Pele, the Brazilian soccer star still regarded as the
best player is the sport’s history, to a then-unprecedented $4.5
million dollar, three-year contract.21 Pele’s impact on the league
was immediate as his presence drastically increased the Cosmos’
15

See id.
Alex Yannis, Soccer Report, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1996, at D3.
17
In addition to its senior roster, each team is permitted a “developmental”
or “youth” roster of players under twenty-five years old. These rosters, which
number ten players, are unregulated as to citizenship status. Developmental or
youth players, however, are generally the team’s lowest paid players, sign nonguaranteed contracts, and can be waived at any time. MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER,
2008 MLS PLAYER RULES & REGULATIONS, supra note 1. They are clearly each
team’s second-tier players and are unlikely to represent their clubs in MLS
competition, rendering their non-discriminatory treatment minimally meaningful
for purposes of this article. See id.
18
WAYNE DOUGLAS RASMUSSEN, HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF FOUR MAJOR
ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH PROFESSIONAL SOCCER IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA BETWEEN 1894 AND 1994 (May 18, 1995) (unpublished Ed.D
dissertation, Temple University) (on file with Samuel L. Paley Library, Temple
University).
19
ROGER ALLAWAY ET AL, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN SOCCER
HISTORY 204-05 (David B. Biesel ed., Scarecrow Press, Inc. 2001).
20
Id. at 202.
21
Id. at 229.
16
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popularity.22 Pleased with Pele’s contribution, the Cosmos, during
the following few years, continued to stock its roster with star
players from other countries.23 Other teams, to the extent they
could manage it financially, followed suit.24
The imported players lent the NASL credibility that it had not
previously enjoyed and sparked a substantial rise in attendance.
Whereas average League attendance per game before Pele’s arrival
was 7,653 spectators, by 1977 it had nearly doubled to 14,640.25
While the League-wide increase was substantial, the rise in
attendance at Cosmos home games was meteoric. Before the 1977
season, the team’s attendance record for a home game was
28,436.26 Early in the 1977 season, on June 5, they broke the
attendance record with a home crowd of 31,208.27 One week later,
they broke the record again with a crowd of 36,826, and a week
after that, they shattered the record with 62,394 spectators.28 In
August of 1977, they set yet another attendance record, this time
hosting 77,691 spectators.29 Many other NASL teams entertained
huge crowds as well during 1977,30 and the NASL’s popularity had
so increased that the American Broadcasting Corporation (“ABC”)
nationally televised a weekly NASL game.31
With soccer
spectatorship on the rise throughout the country, NASL teams
scrambled to sign players who would attract fan interest and,
consequently, “foreign superstars were arriving by the
planeload.”32
Not long thereafter, however, the NASL’s fortunes
precipitously collapsed. Within five years, all of the NASL’s
original teams had folded and the NASL was reeling.33 Convinced
that the predominance of international players and the salaries
international superstars commanded caused the decline, the NASL
22

During the several home games before Pele joined the Cosmos, the team
averaged 7,000 spectators, upon his addition, average attendance jumped to
16,000 fans, and after his season-ending injury, attendance dropped back to an
average 7,000 spectators. See Id. at 200.
23
Id. at 191-92.
24
Id. at 230; see also, Seth Lubove, Soccer Socialism (Major League
Soccer Chairman Alan Rothenberg), FORBES, Dec. 18, 1995, at 259.
25
ALLAWAY ET AL., supra note 19, at 201.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
See RASMUSSEN, supra note 18, at 41.
30
Such crowds included “32,165 in Los Angeles, 45,888 in Minnesota,
32,605 in St. Louis, 56,265 in Seattle, 45,288 in Tampa, 30,277 in Vancouver
and 31,283 in Washington.” ALLAWAY ET AL., supra note 19, at 201.
31
Id. at 202.
32
See id at 201.
33
See id at 203. (“The indications that the NASL was losing ground became
unmistakable in 1982. Perhaps the worst was the fact that ABC did not renew
its television contract.”)
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sought to “Americanize” as much as possible in hopes of saving
the league.34 Although league rules already mandated that each
team’s roster contain at least six Americans,35 the league took the
further steps of limiting the number of non-American players
permitted in a game at any given time and creating one team,
called Team America, on which no foreign citizens were permitted
to play.36 The rule alterations, however, did little to revive the
NASL, and prior to the start of the 1985 season, the league
disbanded.37
Even a cursory examination of the NASL’s ills and the
discriminatory actions it took in hopes of curing them reveals the
league’s solution to be hopelessly overbroad. While the NASL’s
failure lay in teams’ exploding salary structures, and while many
of the league’s highest earning players were non-citizens, it was
their cost, rather than their citizenship status, that doomed the
league. Indeed, the presence of international players had been
indispensable to the development of American soccer for nearly a
century and, in fact, but for an interest in soccer spurred by
international players, the NASL would not have existed.
B. American Soccer’s International Grounding
America’s first soccer league of note, the American Soccer
League (“ASL”), operated during the 1920’s and early 1930’s,
with teams located in the Mid-Atlantic and Northeastern United
States.38 Although founded in 1921, the “heart of [the league’s]
tenure” began in 1924 and ran through 1928.39 The defining
characteristic of that period, during which the ASL achieved its
greatest success, was the league’s inclusion, beginning during the
summer of 1924, of substantial numbers of international players.40
As foreign players entered the league, bringing with them a
34

DANIEL L. CICCARELLI, A REVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL AND
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES INVOLVED IN THE ACCEPTANCE OF SOCCER AS A
PROFESSIONAL SPORT IN THE UNITED STATES (Jan. 25, 1984) (unpublished Ed.
D dissertation, Temple University) (on file with Samuel Paley Library, Temple
University).
35
See KYLE ROTE JR. & BASIL KANE, KYLE ROTE, JR.’S COMPLETE BOOK
OF SOCCER 114 (1978).
36
See CICCARELLI, supra note 34, at 125-26.
37
See MICHAEL L. LABLANC & RICHARD HENSHAW, THE WORLD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCCER 320 (1994).
38
The level of play in the ASL was, by any standard, exceptional. Indeed,
“[s]everal eminent soccer historians concur that some of the best soccer in the
world was regularly played in the United States at the time, primarily in the ASL
. . . .” ANDREI MARKOVITS & STEVEN L. HELLERMAN, OFFSIDE – SOCCER AND
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 111 (2001).
39
ALLAWAY ET AL., supra note 19, at 8.
40
See id. at 9-10.
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dynamic style of play theretofore seldom seen in the United States,
the league’s popularity and prosperity expanded.41 More popular
even than intra-league matches were exhibition matches between
ASL teams and teams which had traveled from other nations to
play.42 The ASL experience reveals that professional American
soccer was, from the very beginning, rooted in the international
game. Rather than weakening the league, international players
strengthened it.43 And, indeed, the league’s ultimate demise was a
result not of foreign players’ predominance or salary demands, but
of the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing great depression.
As it happened, the ASL’s teams were disproportionately located
in manufacturing towns, such as Bethlehem, Pennsylvania and Fall
River, Massachusetts – towns whose economies were particularly
ravaged during the depression and rendered incapable of
supporting professional soccer teams.44 Within a few years of the
crash, the ASL folded.45
For decades, no American soccer league would achieve the
prominence of the ASL, but when one finally did achieve such
prominence, it did so as the ASL had, through the use of
international players. The International Soccer League (“ISL”),
founded in 1960 and existent through 1965, was American in the
sense that the league staged its games on American soil, but was
distinctly non-American in that the league consisted of between ten
and sixteen teams of international players based in other nations –
but playing in the ISL during their home leagues’ off-seasons –
and only one team of American players.46 Despite the ISL’s
scarcity of American players, the league sparked considerable
interest, and crowds of over 10,000 spectators – quite large in the
American soccer context at the time – routinely attended games.47
41

A May 1, 1926 match between the all-Jewish Viennese Hakoah club and
a combination of players from the Indiana Flooring and the New York Giants
teams drew a crowd of 46,000 spectators, a record that stood until Pele’s career
in the NASL. See MARKOVITS & HELLERMAN, supra note 38, at 111; See also
ALLAWAY ET AL., supra note 19, at 10.
42
See ALLAWAY ET AL., supra note 19, at 10.
43
Like some of the NASL’s foreign players, the ASL’s international stars
commanded high salaries and the cost of employing those players seemed to pay
off as “stars chose to immigrate to the United States as the pay was every bit as
good, if not better, than other professional leagues around the world.”
RASMUSSEN supra note 18, at 20; See ALLAWAY ET AL., supra note 19, at 10.
44
See CICIARELLI, supra note 34, at 55.
45
The date of the ASL’s folding is unclear. See ALLAWAY ET AL., supra
note 19, at 10 (“Exactly when the league came to an end is difficult to pinpoint,
because it folded somewhat in stages, making the end either 1931, 1932, or
1933, depending on which stage of its demise is considered the real end.”)
46
See RICHARD HENSHAW, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD SOCCER 372-73
(1979).
47
See MARKOVITS & HELLERMAN, supra note 38, at 119.
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By 1966, when Federation Internationale de Football
Association – soccer’s global governing body better known by its
acronym, FIFA – prepared to stage its quadrennial soccer
tournament pitting the world’s top national teams against each
other, American interest in soccer, sparked largely by the ISL’s
success and popularity, had risen to an unprecedented level.48 So
desirous were American fans of seeing the tournament’s final
game between England and West Germany49 that the National
Broadcasting Corporation (“NBC”) contracted to broadcast it live
across North America.50
Reaction to the broadcast was
overwhelmingly positive, prompting a scramble among United
States soccer promoters to capitalize on Americans’ increasing
interest in soccer through creation of new professional soccer
leagues.51 Thus, during the following year, two rival professional
soccer leagues began play in the United States: the United Soccer
Association (“USA”) and the National Professional Soccer League
(“NPSL”).52
The USA adopted, but altered, the ISL’s model of professional
American soccer. Like the ISL, the USA imported entire teams
from other nations to compete in the United States.53 Unlike the
ISL, however, the USA affiliated each of the twelve imported
teams with an American city.54 So, during the two month-long
USA season, for example, Italy’s Cagliari soccer club represented
Chicago and Ireland’s Glentoran Belfast soccer club represented
Detroit.55 The NPSL took a more traditional approach to league
creation, recruiting players to play for newly formed NPSL
teams.56
Each league held a substantial advantage over the other. FIFA
publicly supported the USA, giving the league instant credibility,
and, in fact, FIFA went so far as to outlaw the NPSL and threaten
the league’s players with suspension from international
competition.57 While the NPSL lacked the FIFA support the USA
enjoyed, the NPSL managed to establish a television contract with
48

See ROTE, JR. & KANE, supra note 35, at 88.
In 1949, Germany was divided into two states, East Germany and West
Germany. The country unified in 1990. See Robert M. Berdahl, German
Reunification in Historical Perspective, 23 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 496, 499
(2005).
50
See Lawrence Casey, Sports Ledger, CHICAGO DAILY DEFENDER, Aug. 2,
1966, at 25.
51
See RASMUSSEN, supra note 18, at 28.
52
Id. at 30; MARKOVITS & HELLERMAN, supra note 38, at 164-65.
53
LABLANC & HENSHAW, supra note 37, at 314.
54
Id.
55
See id.
56
See Deane McGowen, Plans for Nationwide 11-Team Pro Soccer League
Formulated Here, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1966, at 83.
57
See ALLAWAY ET AL., supra note 19, at 197.
49
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the Columbia Broadcasting System (“CBS”), which created a
potential revenue stream to which the USA did not have access.58
Neither league, however, succeeded in its inaugural year, and
in the following year, 1968, the leagues merged to form the
NASL.59 Standing on the shoulders of the ASL, the ISL, and USA
– all of which included, and benefited from, international players –
and born of the enthusiasm the 1966 FIFA World Cup engendered
among American soccer fans, the NASL was indubitably deeply
rooted in the international game. And, indeed, as noted above, the
NASL achieved its greatest successes due to non-citizen players’
participation.
So, while a pursuit of high priced international players
ultimately seemed to damage the NASL, an international presence
did not. Indeed, the histories of American soccer generally, and of
the NASL in particular, provide no reason to believe that
international players who were not exorbitantly remunerated were
detrimental to the league’s success. Rather, excessively high
salaries, to whomever they may have been granted, precipitated the
NASL’s demise. Consistently regulated salary structures, rather
than citizenship discrimination, therefore, could seemingly have
been its salvation.60
The NASL, however, opted for
discrimination, and years later, the MLS, justifying discrimination
as necessary to the league’s survival, did the same.

II. THE EUROPEAN LESSON
While the MLS Policy is unique on the American sporting
landscape, such policies have long prevailed elsewhere in the
world.61 So, although a rarity at home, the Policy, when
conceived, found grounding in the global soccer community
context. That context, however, began shifting in recent decades,
and on the eve of the MLS’s founding, it shifted mightily. A
Belgian soccer player named Jean-Marc Bosman successfully
58

Id. at 198.
In 1967, the NPSL filed an $18 million lawsuit for restraint of trade
against FIFA, the United States Soccer Football Association, and the USA, but
“by the end of [the first] season, both leagues had run up huge financial losses,
made little, if any, impact on the American sports public . . . and decided to
merge for the 1968 season after the NPSL agreed to drop its lawsuit against the
USA and its organizational allies.” MARKOVITS & HELLERMAN, supra note 38,
at 165.
60
The NASL attempted to implement a salary cap in its final year of
existence, but the league’s financial woes were by then beyond remedy. Clive
Gammon, The Nasl: It’s Alive But on Death Row, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 7,
1984, at 74.
61
See Martin Greenberg & James Gray, Citizenship Based Quota Systems in
Athletics, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 337, 340-41 (1996).
59

11

challenged nationality restrictions imposed by the Union of
European Football Associations (“UEFA”), the body charged with
governing soccer on the European continent, which is home to the
world’s most prestigious and competitive soccer leagues.62 The
Bosman decision reverberated throughout the soccer world and, as
discussed below, must certainly have sparked MLS analysis as to
such a challenge’s prospects under American law.
A. Presaging Bosman: A Movement Toward Inclusion
As early as the 1960’s, European nations’ soccer leagues began
imposing rules restricting the use of non-citizen players.63
Different nations’ rules have taken different forms, with some
restricting the numbers of non-citizen players a club could employ
and others placing no restrictions on employment but limiting the
number of non-citizens permitted to play during any one game.64
Beginning in 1978, however, UEFA sought to regulate, though
not eliminate, the nationality discrimination prevailing throughout
European soccer. Among the European Union’s member states,65
UEFA moved to prohibit “limitations on the number of contracts
entered into by each club” with citizens of other nations, but chose
not to prohibit restrictions on the number of non-citizen players
permitted to participate in any particular match.66 Instead, UEFA
set a floor on the latter form of discrimination – requiring that no
league rule limit the number of non-citizen players appearing in a
game to fewer than two.67
Just over a decade later, UEFA further narrowed the scope of
permissible discrimination through its “three + two rule”.68 With
this rule, UEFA decreed leagues could not require that teams
restrict the numbers of non-citizen players on their lists of players
62

See Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des societes de football
association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liegeois SA v. Jean-Marc
Bosman and others and Union des associations europeennes de football (UEFA)
v. Jean-Marc Bosman (“Bosman”), 1995 E.C.R. I-4921, para. 129.
63
Id. at para. 25.
64
See Jesse Gary, Note, The Demise Of Sport? The Effect of Judicially
Mandated Free Agency on European Football and American Baseball, 38
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 293, 298 (2005).
65
Twenty-seven of Europe’s forty-eight nations are members of the
European Union. See EUROPA, Member States of the EU,
http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/eu_members/index_en.htm (last visited
Feb. 1, 2009).
66
See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921, at para. 26.
67
See Amikam Omer Kranz, The Bosman Case: The Relationship Between
European Union Law And The Transfer System in European Football, 5
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 431, 435 (1999).
68
See Rachel B. Arnedt, Comment, European Union Law And Football
Nationality Restrictions: The Economics And Politics Of The Bosman Decision,
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eligible to play in a particular game (“Team Sheets”) to fewer than
three.69 The rule also mandated that leagues let teams place on
their Team Sheets two additional non-citizens, provided those noncitizens had played in the country in question uninterruptedly for
five years.70 Leagues were, of course, allowed to permit teams to
play more non-citizens than the five described, but not fewer.71
So, while the rule expanded opportunities for non-citizen players in
Europe, it stopped short of eliminating nationality discrimination.
In 1995, four years after UEFA implemented the “three + two
rule,” the Court of Justice of the European Communities (“ECJ”)72
took the opportunity to assess the legality of such discrimination in
deciding the Bosman case.73 And despite nationality restrictions’
longevity and wide-ranging acceptance, the Court found them
unlawful.74
B. The Bosman Case
Beginning in 1986, Jean-Marc Bosman played for the Belgian
soccer club RC Liege, under a five-year contract.75 As the contract
term neared its end, RC Liege offered to extend Bosman’s contract
for one year if he accepted a salary reduction.76 Bosman refused
the offer and managed to obtain a contract from a different team,
US Dunkerque, based in France rather than Belgium.77 Under
UEFA rules, a player who leaves a team upon contract expiration
is only permitted to join another team if the latter team pays the
former a transfer fee.78 Although US Dunkerque and RC Liege
initially agreed upon transfer compensation, RC Liege, anticipating
US Dunkerque’s impending insolvency, essentially voided the deal
69

Id.
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71
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72
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Dunkerque, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL
Union des Associations Européennes de Football; Union des Associations
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by failing to request that Belgian soccer’s governing body,
URBSFA, send the French Football Association a certificate
clearing the transaction.79 Bosman, thusly rendered unemployed,
sued RC Liege, URBSFA, and UEFA,80 challenging the transfer
fee requirement under Article 48 of the Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community (the “Treaty of Rome”), which
regards freedom of movement among workers.81 In addition,
Bosman argued that Article 48 rendered unlawful the UEFA rules
permitting leagues to impose nationality restrictions.82
Although UEFA asserted that no nationality restriction ever
hindered Bosman’s career and that his argument bearing on such
restrictions was, therefore, not appropriately before the Court, the
Court felt otherwise.83 Noting that nationality restrictions “are the
foundation of the rules of the various European football
associations which reduce [Bosman’s] chances of finding
employment in other [European Union] member states,” the Court
found the claim admissible.84 Moreover, upon analysis, the Court,
as noted above, ruled the nationality restrictions unlawful.
The Court minced no words in rejecting the restrictions,
stating, “[n]o deep cognition is required to reach the conclusion
that the rules on foreign players are of a discriminatory nature.
They represent an absolutely classic case of discrimination . . . .
The rules on foreign players are therefore incompatible with the
prohibition of discrimination under Article 48 . . . .”85 The Court
acknowledged that restrictions on numbers of non-citizen players
permitted to play in a game were less burdensome than restrictions
on numbers of non-citizen players permitted under contract, but the
Court nonetheless found restrictions of both sorts inconsistent with
Article 48.86 Under threat of substantial economic damages,
UEFA complied with the Court’s decision and abandoned its
policy permitting nationality discrimination.87
So, although nationality restrictions endured in European
soccer for decades, they could not endure direct legal challenge.
And, in the end, the question was not a close one. In ultimately
dispatching the defendants’ argument, the Court explained “[t]he
79
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rules on foreign players breach [anti-discrimination] principles in
such a blatant and serious manner that any reference to national
interests . . . must be regarded as inadmissible as against those
principles.”88
III. BOSMAN’S STATESIDE RELEVANCE: ASSESSING THE MERITS OF A
BOSMAN-STYLE CHALLENGE TO THE MLS POLICY
The Bosman decision was groundbreaking, and while of course
not binding in the American context, in Bosman’s wake, MLS
organizers must certainly have analyzed their prospective league’s
potential exposure under American law. Any such analysis would
have centered then, as it would today, on two statutes. Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”). These statutes, and
their applicability to MLS international player restrictions, are
addressed in turn.

A. Title VII, Espinoza, and the MLS Policy
Title VII operates as this nation’s most significant employment
discrimination statute.89 The statute reads, in relevant part:
“[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”90

Title VII’s prohibition applies to both private and public
employers with fifteen or more employees,91 which means the
88

Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921, at para. 142. The Bosman decision, which
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L. J. 431, 432-33 (2005).
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prohibition applies to American professional sports organizations’
employment practices.92 As such, Title VII applies to the MLS
Policy, and the nature of the Policy’s exclusion seemingly invites a
national origin discrimination claim.93 An analysis of what
“national origin” discrimination encompasses, however, reveals the
difficulty any such charge would face.
Title VII does not clearly define the term “national origin.”94
While Title VII defines what “sex” and “religion” mean in the
context of the statute, it does not do the same for “race,” “color,”
or “national origin.”95 The omission, of course, created for courts
the opportunity to read into “national origin” what they felt
appropriate, and the consequence was a narrower definition than
might otherwise apply. After substantial debate in the lower
courts as to the meaning of “national origin,” the United States
Supreme Court, in 1973, addressed the issue in deciding Espinoza
v. Farah Manufacturing Co.96 In that case, Farah Manufacturing
Company, pursuant to its policy against hiring non-U.S. citizens,
rejected Cecilia Espinoza’s application for employment with the
company as a seamstress.97 Although Espinoza was a Mexican
citizen, she was, at the time of her rejection, lawfully residing in
the United States.98 Espinoza interpreted Farah Manufacturing’s
hiring policy as privileging individuals of American national origin
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MLS is notably unique among such organizations. Whereas America’s
other premier sports leagues serve as umbrella organizations for the leagues’
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over individuals of Mexican national origin and, thus, violating
Title VII’s prohibition against national origin discrimination.99
Espinoza prevailed before the United States District Court for
the West District of Texas, which found that Farah
Manufacturing’s refusal to employ non-U.S. citizens amounted to
national origin discrimination under the statute.100 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, reversed,
and the United States Supreme Court affirmed the reversal.101
Both the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court refused to apply
Title VII as Espinoza urged.
Key to the Supreme Court’s ultimate disposition was a
distinction between national origin and citizenship. Recognizing
that Congress, in crafting Title VII, failed to define the term
“national origin,” the Court turned, for insight, to various portions
of the Act’s legislative history, ultimately concluding that the Act’s
prohibition on national origin discrimination does not “make[] it
illegal to discriminate on the basis of citizenship or alienage”102
Espinoza, therefore, teaches that among US citizens, employers
may not, under Title VII, discriminate against persons because of
their national origins, but that employers may, under Title VII,
lawfully discriminate against non-US citizens, whatever their
national origins, simply because they are not US citizens. MLS’
citizenship discrimination, therefore, would seem to pass muster
under Espinoza. It does not disadvantage US citizens of any
particular national origin. Rather, it disadvantages non-citizens vis
a vis citizens, which is precisely what the Espinoza Court deemed
lawful.
B. IRCA and the MLS Policy
IRCA’s protections, however, reach beyond Title VII’s
national origin discrimination prohibition to protect individuals
Espinoza leaves vulnerable.103 Congress enacted IRCA primarily
to prohibit the employment of unauthorized aliens, but included in
IRCA an anti-discrimination provision, which created a theretofore
unprecedented cause of action for persons seeking to challenge
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employment-based citizenship discrimination.104
Under the
statute, it is unlawful to discriminate in the hiring or recruitment
of, or to discriminatorily discharge, any non-US citizen who is a
permanent US resident, an asylee or a refugee.105 IRCA’s antidiscrimination provision received its first significant test in 1987,
less than a year after its enactment.
During the previous year, Zeki Yeni Komsu, a Turkish citizen
and United States permanent resident, applied to be a pilot with
Mesa Airlines.106
The airline, however, rejected Komsu’s
application pursuant to its policy of hiring only United States
citizens unless such citizens were unavailable for hire.107 Upon
learning of Mesa Airlines’ decision and the policy underlying it,
Komsu filed a citizenship discrimination action with the U.S.
Department of Justice’s Office of Special Counsel (OSC), the
administrative body responsible for fielding IRCA claims.108 The
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) hearing the Komsu case found
that Mesa’s policy flatly violated IRCA’s antidiscrimination
mandate.109
While Title VII’s national origin prohibition provision poses
little threat to a regime of citizenship discrimination, IRCA
potentially poses a substantial threat, which MLS organizers may
well have recognized. To comport with IRCA, MLS could not
have flatly privileged citizens over non-citizens, but rather required
a more nuanced form of discrimination, which is what the Policy
provides. Closely tracking IRCA’s language, the Policy, as noted
in Part I, privileges a player who is a U.S. citizen or “a permanent
resident (green card holder) or the holder of other special status
(e.g., has been granted refugee or asylum status).” The Policy
seems, therefore, to permit discrimination only to the extent IRCA
does, and thus to avoid IRCA liability. Through crafting the
Policy as it did, MLS has averted UEFA’s fate.
104
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So, while Bosman successfully challenged nationality
restrictions in Europe, there appeared little threat, as MLS began
operations, that a Bosman analogue in the United States could have
similar success in challenging the Policy. Indeed, the Bosman
decision, through highlighting the possibility of legal challenge,
may have increased MLS organizers’ vigilance in crafting the
Policy to comport with applicable American law. Ultimately, in
MLS’ fourteen-year existence, the Policy has endured no
substantial challenge.
IV. THE CASE FOR A RACE CLAIM
A searching examination of the MLS Policy and its
consequences, however, reveals the Policy has spawned an
additional societal cost – racial discrimination. Whatever one’s
view of the MLS Policy and MLS’s intention in enacting it, the
Policy serves to numerically limit the league’s players of color.
The percentage of MLS’ players of color has never risen above
42%.110 And, at the start of the 2006 season, players of color
comprised only 39% of the league.111
If MLS did not cap the number of international players
permitted on its teams, however, the league’s complexion would
likely be quite different. The international players who join MLS
hail primarily from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa, and
are, unsurprisingly, largely of color.112 The league’s domestic
players are, in contrast, largely white.113 While domestic players
can compete for all of MLS’ roster positions, international players
must compete among themselves for a subset of those positions.114
In essence, then, the MLS Policy sets a higher bar for these
international players, the majority of whom are of color, than it
sets for domestic players, the majority of whom are white.
So, while the Policy may be invulnerable to IRCA challenge
and Title VII national origin challenge, this demographic
consequence suggests the Policy may be vulnerable to Title VII
challenge under race analysis. Such vulnerability exists whatever
MLS’s intent, as employers are potentially liable for both
intentional (disparate treatment) discrimination and unintentional
(disparate impact) discrimination. Discussion of these two Title
110

See RICHARD LAPCHICK, DEVOS SPORT BUS. MGMT. PROGRAM, THE
2006 RACIAL AND GENDER REPORT CARD: MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER (2007),
http://www.bus.ucf.edu/sport/public/downloads/2006_RGRC_MLS.pdf at 12.
(last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
111
Id.
112
See MLS PLAYERS, http://www.mlsnet.com/players/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
113
Id.
114
See MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER, 2008 MLS PLAYER RULES &
REGULATIONS, supra note 1.

19

VII theories and their potential application in the MLS context
follow.
A. The MLS Policy as Disparate Treatment Discrimination
While there exists no dispositive evidence of discriminatory
intent, it is certainly possible MLS desired a predominantly white
league and believed the Policy to be a lawful means of attaining
that outcome. To assume MLS desired a predominantly white
league is, of course, not necessarily to assume the League’s
decision-makers were perniciously racist. Indeed, from the
beginning, MLS has actively reached out to Latino fans.115
However, perhaps recognizing that the majority of its league-wide
fan base would be white,116 MLS may have made a calculated
business decision that the fledgling league would most easily attain
success if the majority of its players were white. Such a decision
would not have been unprecedented or, necessarily, irrational.
1.

The Economic Incentive to Discriminate

Consider, for example, the NBA’s Boston Celtics’
organizational history. Although the Celtics were the first team
115
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in the NBA to employ a black player,117 to put an entirely black
team on the court at the same time,118 and to hire a black coach,119
some twenty years after accomplishing these milestones, at a time
when almost seventy-five percent of the league’s players were
black,120 “the Celtics were conspicuous as the NBA team
employing fewer black players than any other.”121 In fact, during
the 1985-86 and 1986-87 seasons, “the Celtics’ twelve-man roster
consisted of four black players and eight white players and [thus]
stood in sharp contrast with the composition of the league.”122 The
team’s composition was certainly no accident. Noting the Celtics’
disproportionately high number of white players, University of
Massachusetts Sociologist Wornie Reed, during the 1986-87
season, launched a statistical analysis of the disproportionality, and
concluded the Celtics intentionally considered race in crafting the
team’s roster.123 So dedicated were the Celtics to this raceconsidered roster construction, that disproportionate whiteness
became central to the organization’s identity. Indeed, even years
after the Celtics abandoned such blatant discriminatory hiring
practices, writes Washington Post and ESPN journalist Michael
Wilbon, “the Celtics are synonymous with whiteness . . . .”124
While Reed did not proceed to explore the reasons underlying
the Celtics long-standing discriminatory player personnel hiring
practices, the Celtics’ historical development as an economic
enterprise reveals the team’s motivation – they did it to please the
fans and, therefore, to maximize fan-generated profits.125 The
Celtics’ transformation from equal opportunity pioneer to stark
racial disproportionality was spurred:
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by professional basketball’s, and thus the Celtics’s evolution
during the 1970’s from a little known entertainment source
into a substantial economic enterprise reliant on attracting a
fan-base to pay admission and fill arena seats. Attracting fans
in racially polarized Boston, and thus ensuring economic
viability, demanded a largely white team.126

Jo Jo White, a Celtic for several years during the 1980’s,
plainly explains that the city of Boston simply “wouldn’t support a
majority black team, even if it were successful,” and as such, in
creating an overwhelmingly white team, Celtics management was
“merely responding to the will of the people.”127 Former Celtics
co-owner Alan Cohen expressed the same sentiment in more veiled
terms, indicating the importance in the overwhelmingly black
NBA of “hav[ing] some balance on the team, in terms of race.”128
While the Celtics’ consideration of race in constructing their
roster was particularly obvious, it was certainly not anomalous.
Consider former Cleveland Cavaliers owner Ted Stepien’s view on
considering race in crafting his team’s roster: “[H]alf the squad
should be white. I think people are afraid to speak out on that
subject. White people have to have white heroes. I’ll be truthful, I
respect [blacks], but I need white people. It’s in me.”129 Utah Jazz
leadership has seemingly maintained a similar perspective. In fact,
in each season since 1990, “the percentage of white players on the
Utah Jazz’s roster has outstripped the percentage of white players
in the league.”130
Although such race consideration might initially impress as
aberrant, it is not. In a groundbreaking 1991 American Journal of
Economics & Sociology study, a study published only a few years
after the Celtics fielded their grossly disproportionate teams and
only a few years before MLS’ founding, scholars Eleanor Brown,
Diane Keenan, and Richard Spiro examined the preferences of
NBA fans, and concluded, “white fans… have a taste for seeing

126

Duru, supra note 4, at 396.
BRYANT, supra note 6, at 144; ARATON & BONDY, supra note 6, at 58.
128
ARATON & BONDY, supra note 6, at 123.
129
Id. at 181.
130
Duru, supra note 4, at 400 (citing Richard Lapchick, The 2008 Racial
and Gender Report Card: National Basketball Association, 2007,
http://www.bus.ucf.edu/sport/public/downloads/NBA_Report_Card_2008.pdf
(last visited Feb. 1, 2009) (notably, Dr. Lapchick did not compile statistics for
the
2002-03
NBA
season);
http://www.nba.com/jazz/history/history_roster_ah.html?nav=ArticleList (last
visited Feb. 1, 2009); www.basket-stats.info/players/abc/f.htm (last visited Feb. 1,
127

2009).

22

white players.”131
This customer discrimination seemingly
motivated clubs’ personnel decisions across the NBA.132
Unfortunately, the race-considered roster construction
phenomenon has not vanished; it has endured. A 2002 Journal of
Sports Economics study, reflecting on the aforementioned 1991
American Journal of Economics & Sociology study, revealed that
still, after the century’s turn, “[NBA] teams are responding to
customer discrimination.”133 Indeed, as acclaimed New York
Times Sports Columnist Bill Rhoden expresses in his 2007 book,
Forty Million Dollar Slaves: The Rise, Fall, and Redemption of the
Black Athlete, “the NBA actively grooms as many non-black
players as it can.”134 Although perhaps glaring in the NBA, the
phenomenon is not restricted to that context, as revealed by a 2001
Texas Hispanic Journal of Law and Policy study concluding that
like the market for NBA players, “the market for Major League
Baseball players is characterized by customer discrimination.”135
131
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‘white’ presence on their teams without sacrificing competitiveness through
filling their final several roster spots – the spots allocated to reserves –
disproportionately with white players. Indeed, “[w]hile, in 1991, 72.4% of the
league’s players were black and 27.6% were white, of the [seldom used
reserves], only 47.4% were black and 52.6% were white.” Duru, supra note 4, at
397 (citing ARATON & BONDY, supra note 6, at 124). Again, the trend was most
noticeable with regard to the Celtics: “[w]ith the exception of Artis Gilmore for
forty-seven games in 1988, the Celtics’ backup center position to Robert Parish
was virtually a closed union shop, passed down from Rick Robey to Eric
Fernstern to Greg Kite to Bill Walton to Mark Acres to Brad Lohaus to Joe
Kleine. If a fading white veteran such as Walton, Pete Maravich, Scott
Wedman, or Jim Paxson was available, the Celtics could be counted on to make
room.” ARATON & BONDY, supra note 6, at 122. And, as one Boston
sportswriter, explains, the trend was no secret: “[i]t’s been a running joke for
years: white plus height equals a job with the Boston Celtics. The white guy
will always find a home in a Boston jersey. If it wasn’t Jerry Sichting, it was
Scott Wedman, or Greg Kite, Mark Acres, Jim Paxson, or Fred Roberts.”
BRYANT, supra note 6, at 144.
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Richard Burdekin, Richard Hossfeld & Janet Smith, Are NBA Fans
Becoming Indifferent to Race? Evidence from the 1990s, 6 J. OF SPORTS ECON.
144, 147-48 (2002). Burdekin, Hossfeld, and Smith note that although the
NBA, as a whole, does not erect racially discriminatory barriers to entry, “there
remains a correlation between a team’s racial composition and the racial
composition of the city in which the team is based.” Id. at 155.
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WILLIAM C. RHODEN, FORTY MILLION DOLLAR SLAVES 67 (2006).
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Ilyana M. Kuziemko & Geoffrey C. Rapp, Customer Racial
Discrimination in Major League Baseball: Is There No Hope For Equal Pay?, 7
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It is conceivable, then, that, recognizing the customer
discrimination existent in American sport and thus potentially
existent among MLS’ prospective fans, and desperate to launch a
successful league, the MLS brain trust intended to limit the number
of non-white players in the league and to do so by means of the
Policy. While MLS has never made any such admission, it has
clearly considered, and catered to, perceived fan preferences
regarding race and ethnicity through its allocation of players
among teams.136 While such strategic allocation does not confirm
that MLS instituted the Policy as a means of satisfying league-wide
race-based customer discrimination, it certainly supports that
possibility.
2. Building the Race Discrimination Case: The Individual
Action
Of course, even if both precedented and perhaps rational, if the
MLS intentionally limits the numbers of blacks and Latinos in its
ranks, it violates Title VII’s prohibition on race-based
discrimination.137 And while, as noted above, there does not
TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL'Y 119, 142 (2001). It bears noting that scholars are not
united on this score. For instance, economists Craig A. Depken II and Jon M.
Ford, examining fan selection of MLB All-Star Game participants between the
years 1990 and 2000, concluded that there did not exist customer-based
discrimination against minority players. See Craig A. Depken II and Jon M.
Ford, Customer-Based Discrimination Against Major League Baseball Players:
Additional
Evidence
from
All-Star
Ballots,
http://www.uta.edu/depken/P/cbd.pdf. (last visited Feb. 1, 2009)
136
Stefan Fatsis, Futbol invades the U.S.—again, WALL STREET JOURNAL,
April 5, 1996, at B9 (detailing MLS’ strategic initial player assignments).
137
The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”), which Congress created to enforce Title VII, see Julie Chi-hye Suk,
Antidiscrimination Law in the Administrative State, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 405,
438 (2006), categorizes Latinos/as as a racial group for Title VII purposes and
protects them from race-based employment discrimination. See U.S. Equal
Employment
Opportunity
Commission,
Race/Color
Discrimination,
http://eeoc.gov/types/race.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2009) (“Equal employment
opportunity cannot be denied any person because of his/her racial group . . . .
Title VII’s prohibitions apply regardless of whether the discrimination is
directed at Whites, Blacks, Asians, Latinos . . . .”). Latinos/as are, however,
“racially heterogeneous,” rendering this racial categorization awkward and
problematic.
Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confundidos: De-Conflating
Latinos/As’ Race and Ethnicity, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 69, 90-94 (1998);
Angela P. Harris, From Color Line to Color Chart?: Racism and Colorism in
the New Century, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 52, 57-58 (2008). This
reduction of “Latinos[/as] to an American racialized group” ignores “historical
differences and diverse experiences” among members of the Latino/a
community, Sandrino-Glasser, supra note at 94, and has confused judges. See
Harris, supra note at 57. Nonetheless, because Title VII deems Latinos/as a
protected racial group, Title VII would potentially provide a Latino MLS player
or prospective player a cause of action for racial employment discrimination.
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appear to exist evidence of such intent, no such evidence is
necessary for Title VII liability to adhere. Indeed, recognizing the
often covert nature of discrimination in America,138 the Supreme
Court has concluded that plaintiffs need not present direct evidence
of discrimination to establish Title VII liability. In fact, through its
decisions in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green139 and Texas
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,140 the Court created a
three-stage burden-shifting framework designed to identify veiled
intentional discrimination in Title VII cases.141
As an initial matter, under the framework, a plaintiff is required
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.142 To do so, he
must show that: (i) he belongs to a class of individuals protected
under Title VII; (ii) he was qualified for the position;143 (iii) he was
138

See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust., 487 U.S. 977, 978 (1988)
(“Simply because no inference of discriminatory intent can be drawn . . . it does
not follow that these surpervisors always act without discriminatory intent.
Even if it is assumed that discrimination by individual supervisors can be
policed through disparate treatment analysis, that analysis would not solve the
problem created by subconscious stereotypes and prejudices that lead to conduct
prohibited by Title VII.”).
139
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
140
Tex. Dep’t. of Cmty. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
141
See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at
254.
142
See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at
252-253. While the prima facie case is an established element of Title VII
disparate treatment actions, many commentators have long viewed it as
unhelpful and unnecessary for the disposition of disparate treatment cases. See
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2008/04/whats-so-great.html.
(last visited Feb. 1, 2009). The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit recently joined these calls for its elimination, asserting the prima facie
case inquiry is “a largely unnecessary sideshow [which] has not benefited
employees or employers; nor has it simplified or expedited court proceedings”.
Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, No. 06-5362, (D.C. Cir. Mar. 28, 2008).
Going forward in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
the court decreed, when hearing a Title VII disparate treatment action:
“the [ ] court need not--and should not--decide whether the plaintiff
actually made out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas . . . .
Rather, in considering an employer’s motion for summary judgment or
judgment as a matter of law . . . , the district court must resolve one
central question: Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory
reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally
discriminated against the employee on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin?” Id.
143

Importantly, to satisfy this prong of the prima facie case, plaintiff need
not prove greater qualification than the person ultimately hired, and according to
some courts, need not prove equal qualification to the person ultimately hired.
See THOMAS R. HAGGARD, UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 69
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rejected despite his qualifications; and (iv) the position remained
open for other candidates to pursue.144
If the plaintiff is successful in establishing a prima facie case,
the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its challenged employment
action.145 Assuming the defendant satisfies this burden, plaintiff
may ultimately prevail by proving, again by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the defendant’s proffered reason is pretext for
unlawful discrimination.146
The first two of the framework’s three steps do not require
overwhelming showings. Although a plaintiff carries a burden of
persuasion in making its prima facie case, courts have found the
plaintiff need only create a mere inference of discrimination to
meet the burden.147 The defendant’s burden in responding to the
prima facie case is even lower. It need not persuade. It need only
produce legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its challenged
Policy or decision.148 And whether defendant’s reasons be “silly,”
“implausible,” “fantastic,” or “superstitious,” so long as they are
non-discriminatory, courts may deem them sufficient.149

(2001). Rather, the plaintiff must prove qualification as evidenced by meeting
the position’s minimum criteria. Id.
144
See Zachary D. Fasman & Barbara L. Johnson, Evidence Issues and Jury
Instructions in Employment Cases, SM 059 A.L.I. A.B.A. 243, 262. (2007).
145
See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. Under traditional
disparate treatment analysis, a defendant may, rather than proffer a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason for its actions, acknowledge it discriminated and seek
shelter under the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (“BFOQ”) doctrine. See
Clare Tower Putnam, When Can a Law Firm Discriminate Against its own
Employees to Meet a Client’s Request? Reflections on the ACC’s Call to Action,
9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 657, 662-663 (2007).
This narrow doctrine protects discrimination otherwise prohibited under
Title VII if the discrimination is “reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C 2000e-2(e)(1). It is, of
course, difficult to imagine MLS conceding that its international player
restrictions are pretext for racial discrimination and then arguing that being a
member of a particular race is a BFOQ for playing in MLS. Assuming,
however, that MLS did so, its argument would be unavailing as the BFOQ
defense does not apply in cases of race or color discrimination. Id.
146
See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804.
147
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (establishing a prima facie case is “not
onerous”); see also Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 41 (5th Cir.
1996) (a prima facie case requires “a very minimal showing”).
148
See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
149
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). The ease with which
defendants meet this burden is legendary. Indeed, the 11th Cir. has gone so far as
to hold that an “employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason,
a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as the action is
not for a discriminatory reason.” Nix v. WLCY Radio, 738 F. 2d 1181, 1187
(11th Cir. 1984). (emphasis supplied).
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a. The Pretext Inquiry
Consequently, an individual plaintiff’s challenge to an
employment decision based on the Policy would likely turn on the
pretext inquiry, as disparate treatment challenges often do – with
the plaintiff arguing the citizenship status-based decision not to
hire, ostensibly lawful under Title VII, is pretext for Title VII
prohibited discrimination.
Plaintiff’s argument would, ironically, find support in the
Supreme Court’s Espinoza opinion. Although the Espinoza Court,
as discussed supra, rejected Cecilia Espinoza’s national origin
claim in distinguishing citizenship discrimination from national
origin discrimination and proclaiming the former lawful under
Title VII, the Court warned against employers using citizenship
discrimination as pretext. The Court recognized that its decision
might spur employers to effectuate unlawful Title VII
discrimination under the cloak of citizenship discrimination, and
made clear that such manipulation would not be tolerated. And
while the Espinoza court referenced citizenship discrimination as
pretext for national origin discrimination, its concern – that
citizenship discrimination not crater Title VII’s protections –
logically applies also in the race-discrimination context, as the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
recognized in Anderson v. Zubieta.150
In that case, the Panama Canal Commission (PCC)
implemented a policy advantaging employees who were American
citizens as of a date specific over non-citizens and citizens
naturalized after the specified date.151 Plaintiffs, who were black
and of Panamanian descent and who were naturalized after the
specified date, sued on Title VII race discrimination and national
origin discrimination grounds, alleging that through the policy the
PCC intentionally disadvantaged them.152 Although the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed
plaintiffs’ claims as non-actionable under Title VII, the D.C.
Circuit Court reversed.153 The D.C Circuit found that the Espinoza
Court envisioned lower courts granting such plaintiffs the
opportunity to prove that a Title VII prohibited purpose – whether
discrimination based on race or national origin – underlies an
employer’s citizenship discrimination.154
This pretext inquiry, in the MLS context, would necessarily
involve scrutinizing MLS’ articulated reasons for limiting
150

180 F.3d 329, 340 (D.C. Dist. 1999).
See Id. at 333.
152
See Id. at 334.
153
Id. at 332.
154
Id. at 340.
151
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international players’ presence in the league. While it is, of course,
not possible to precisely predict the reasons MLS would articulate,
the Policy seems to exist to serve MLS’ goals of: (1) ensuring
consistent spectator support among American fans;155 (2)
providing a training ground for US citizen players so as to improve
the national soccer team’s quality;156 and (3) preventing a fiscally
disastrous spending race on international stars.157
It does not appear, however, that discriminating against
international players actually serves these ends; indeed, the
Bosman Court considered these very justifications for nationality
restrictions, and concluded it does not.158 While the Bosman
holding is, as discussed supra, binding only in the European
Community, its reasoning applies with equal strength in the
American context.
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See David Leonhardt, Is Major League Soccer Using its Head? It’s
structure may avoid problems plaguing other sports, BUS. WK. Jan. 29, 1996, at
52 (“To help build a U.S. market, MLS has also made a commitment to
promoting U.S.-born players. Alexi Lalas . . . will play for the New England
Revolution, and his face will grace a box of Kellogg's cereal later this year.
That's a direct appeal to the 13 million soccer-playing kids in the U.S.”)
156
See Grahame L. Jones, Time to Deliver the $22- Million Soccer Goods,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1996, at 1 (quoting Alexi Lalas, 1995 U.S. Player of the
year, saying of American players: “The experience might not be there because
they haven’t had the chance. I think what MLS is going to do is showcase that
talent. In a very short amount of time I think we’re going to get to a level of play
that’s competing with leagues around the world”); Jerry Langdon, U.S. Talent
Gets a Chance to Play at Home, USA TODAY, April 5, 1996, at 8C, (reporting
on MLS Deputy Commissioner Sunil Gulati’s opinion that the MLS provides an
opportunity for American players without international experience to compete
for a place on the national team); see also Dan Gieson, Debut is Here for New
Soccer League MLS Hopes Top Players are a Big Draw, SAN FRANSISCO
CHRONICLE April 4, 1996, at D1 (quoting MLS Commissioner Doug Logan as
saying, “I fully expect us to develop an American style of play. It will probably
take a couple of years to develop, but we’ll put our own thumbprint on soccer.”);
see also Gus Martins, Soccer: The price is tight, cap makes its tougher for MLS
to score, BOSTON HEARLD, Feb. 4, 1996. (“The league’s contradiction is in
simultaneously attempting to be a launching pad for rank-and-file American
players while luring players of international status to legitimize the level of
play.”);
157
See Northrup, supra note 115, at B1 (“The MLS approach is different
than the NASL’s . . . . The NASL tried to attract a following with star power.
International soccer legends such as Pele, Giorgio Chinaglia and Franz
Beckenbauer were signed. . . . It died in the attempt”); Tomas Toch & Anna
Mulrine, Soccer, American Style, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 28, 1996,
at 64. (“But a more serious threat is labor problems. Stars like Lalas insist that
‘the last thing we want to do is shoot ourselves in the foot’ by forcing a bidding
war for players the fledgling league can’t afford.”).
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See Bosman, at para. 142.
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i. Ensuring consistent spectator support
The Bosman defendants argued, just as MLS Policy proponents
have argued, that citizenship discrimination is necessary to
consistent spectator support.159 They asserted, “identification of
the spectators with the various teams [in the league] is guaranteed
only if those teams consist, at least as regards a majority of the
players, of nationals of the relevant Member State.”160 The ECJ
summarily dismissed this justification, explaining there was “no
need for extensive discussion to show the weakness of [the]
argument.”161 Indeed, it noted that many European nations’ teams’
most popular players were nationals of other nations, and, in fact,
in some cases, those foreign players served to establish their
teams’ identities.162 This was the case, the court explained, with
the Italian AC Milan team of the early 1990s, among others.163
This has certainly been the case in American soccer as well – in
the NASL and later in MLS.
The NASL’s New York Cosmos provide perhaps the strongest
illustration. With Brazilian great Pele heading the list, the Cosmos
regularly fielded numerous foreign players and often fielded more
foreign players than American players.164 Still, they were the
NASL’s most popular team drawing larger crowds than had ever
previously attended soccer games on American soil.165
Many of the non-citizen players permitted on MLS teams have
also proven extremely popular among fans. Bolivians Marco
Etchevary and Jamie Moreno long served as the face of MLS’ DC
United.166 And, during the league’s early years, flamboyant
Mexican goalkeeper, Jorge Campos, did the same for the Los
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See Bosman, at para. 141; Leonhardt, supra note 155 at 52.
See Bosman, at para. 143.
161
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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ALLAWAY ET AL., supra note 19, at 191-92.
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Id. at 200. While it is true that many of the Cosmos’ foreign players
were world-renowned stars who commanded salaries that precipitated the
NASL’s financial difficulty, the fact of their non-citizenship certainly did not
lead to decreased popularity or to the league’s decline. So, as discussed briefly,
supra, and as will be discussed in greater detail, infra, while the financial toll of
escalating salaries may reasonably be blamed for the NASL’s demise, the fact of
players’ non-citizenship may not.
160
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See, e.g. Charles Boehm, United Face Must-Win Situation, MLSNET.com, Oct.
31,
2007,
available
at
http://www.mlsnet.com/news/team_news.jsp?ymd=20071031&content_id=126969&vke
y=news_dcu&fext=.jsp&team=t103 (last visited Feb. 1, 2009) (“the South Americans are
sometimes referred to as the ‘magic triangle’ by D.C. fans who first applied the term to
Moreno, Raul Diaz Arce and Marco Etcheverry during United’s late-90s glory days.”).
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Angeles Galaxy.167 More recently, Englishman David Beckham
served as the Galaxy’s, and ultimately the League’s, public face.168
So, in the American context, as well as in the European
context, non-citizens have frequently sparked, rather than detracted
from, spectator support. To justify citizen discrimination as
necessary to maintain observers’ interest, therefore, badly misses
the mark.
ii. Strengthening the National Team
A second justification asserted by the Bosman defendants in
supporting its citizenship status restrictions, and later asserted to
justify the MLS policy, is the importance of such restrictions in
developing a competitive national soccer team.169 The ECJ found
this argument no more convincing than the previous one.170
Indeed, rather than enabling national team development,
nationality restrictions may hamper it. The ECJ explained, “there
is much to support the opinion that the participation of top foreign
players promotes the development of [soccer]. Early contact with
foreign stars ‘can only be of advantage to a young player.’”171 If
this is the case in Europe, it must certainly be the case in the
United States, where soccer is generally played at a lower level
than it is played elsewhere in the world.172 By limiting the
numbers of excellent international players against whom
Americans can compete, and from whom they can learn, the MLS
policy may have an inverse impact to what the league intended – it
may be stagnating, rather than improving, American soccer
talent.173
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See History of the Los Angeles Galaxy 1996 Season Review,
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See id. at 145 (quoting Christoph Palme, Hermann Hepp-Schwab &
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Soccer Transfer System, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 413, 440 (“The American
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MLS organizers recognized, as the Bosman Court did, that foreign
players might benefit the development of American MLS players, but
nonetheless insisted on firm international restrictions, apparently believing too
many foreign players would have a detrimental impact of the league. Alex
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It is certainly the case that, if the MLS were to halt its
discriminatory Policy and non-citizens were to occupy some of the
roster spots currently reserved for citizens, fewer citizen players
would be able to compete in the nation’s premier soccer league.
The competing citizen players, however, would be exposed to a
level of play that would likely improve them and thus the national
team for which they would be candidates. The status quo produces
many citizen players who, by virtue of the competition they face,
may not fulfill their potential. Eliminating the discriminatory
policy, on the other hand, would result in fewer citizen players
who would likely be better than they would otherwise. Perhaps,
then, abandoning citizenship discrimination may ultimately be
more beneficial than detrimental to the United States’ national
team’s prospects.174
iii. Controlling salaries
Finally, the Bosman defendants argued nationality restrictions
were necessary to maintain rough parity among a given league’s
clubs.175 In that foreign stars often command extremely high
salaries, the argument goes, the absence of nationality restrictions
would permit wealthy clubs to attract top flight foreign players to
whom less wealthy clubs would have no access. Taken a step
further, this argument mirrors the argument born of the NASL’s
demise – that demand for foreign players drives up competition for
their services, prompting clubs to overspend and eventually
precipitate league collapse.176

Yannis, M.L.S. is Encouraged, But Remains Cautious, N.Y. TIMES, October 22,
1996, at 17.
174
An altered approach to international players’ inclusion in MLS as a
means of strengthening the United States Men’s National Soccer team could not
hurt, as the team has proceeded beyond opening round games only once in
Olympic tournament play, see Penalty Kick decisive for Chile which takes
bronze
medal
2-0,
SOCCERTIMES.COM,
Sep.
29,
2000,
http://www.soccertimes.com/usteams/2000/games/sep29.htm (last visited Feb.
1, 2009), and has done so only once in three World Cup Championship
tournament appearances since MLS’ origin, See Sampson out as U.S. soccer
coach,
CNNSI,
Oct.
27,
1998,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/soccer/world/events/1998/worldcup/news/1998/
06/29/sampson_final/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2009); US exit signals end of era,
FIFA.COM,
July
10,
2006,
http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/archive/germany2006/news/newsid=27337.html#
us+exit+signals (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
175
Bosman, at para. 147.
176
See John Haydon, MLS Teams designed to have Equal Footing, WASH.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 1996, at D6 (noting that a big factor in the demise of the NASL
was financial inequality between teams).
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While maintaining parity and preventing excessive spending
are legitimate goals,177 as the Bosman Court explained in rejecting
Bosman’s argument, there exist narrower and less burdensome
means of achieving those goals than citizenship discrimination.178
Indeed, an MLS regime of citizenship discrimination as a means of
controlling salaries necessarily presupposes the MLS’ highest
salaried players are all non-citizens. This presupposition is false.
Many non-citizens are modestly salaried and several citizens, to
whom the citizenship restrictions purportedly seeking to control
salaries obviously do not apply, rank among the league’s top
earners.179 In the MLS context, therefore, citizen discrimination
falls flat as a rational approach to salary regulation.
An MLS concern about escalating salaries would suggest, as an
appropriate remedy, reliance on salary – rather than citizenship –
restrictions. And, indeed, the MLS has, since its founding,
enforced salary restrictions. At its inception, each team had a
salary cap of $1.13 million.180 By the start of the 2008 season’s
inception, MLS increased the salary cap to $2.23 million.181 Any
177

Regulating salaries to maintain parity among a league’s teams would
seem, at first blush, to violate anti-competitive principles. Sport, however,
presents a unique case with respect to anti-trust issues. As sports law scholar
Stephen Ross explains:
Sports leagues present special challenges for those interested in a
sound, consumer-oriented approach to antitrust enforcement . . . . In
addition to the need for joint action to produce a product, sports leagues
have perhaps a unique interest in maintaining a significant degree of
competitive balance among the teams within their venture. MATTHEW
MITTEN, TIMOTHY DAVIS, RODNEY SMITH, ROBERT BERRY, SPORTS
LAW AND REGULATION, 418 (2005).
As such, the Supreme Court has recognized that, in the context of sports
leagues, “some agreements among competitors – perhaps even all competitors –
is necessary for there to be a product at all.” Id.
Even among sports leagues, however, MLS is uniquely positioned to repel
antitrust challenges, because the Supreme Court has deemed it a single-entity,
incapable – by definition – of conspiring to restrain trade in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 97 F. Supp.
2d 130 (D. Mass. April 19, 2000) (dismissing eight MLS players’ complaint
alleging MLS artificially suppressed players’ salaries).
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http://www.mlsplayers.org/files/9_7_08_salary_info_alpha.pdf. (last visited Feb.
1, 2009). Indeed, two of MLS’ highest paid players – Landon Donavan and
Claudio Lopez – are American. Id.
180
See Barry Wilner, Will it Fly? New Soccer League Finally Nearing
Takeoff Time, PHILA. INQ., March 31, 1996, at C8.
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Teams,
WASH.
BUS.
J.
Nov.
30,
2007,
available
at
http://soccernet.espn.go.com/columns/story?id=376391&root=americansabroad
&cc=5901 (last visited Feb. 1, 2009). Notably, each MLS team is permitted one
Designated Player, to whom it may pay an unregulated amount, only $415,000
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argument that the Policy is necessary to control salaries, therefore,
fails.
It seems clear, then, that the MLS Policy, and the
discriminatory personnel decisions made pursuant thereto, do not
fulfill the legitimate, non-discriminatory purposes upon which
MLS would most likely rely in repelling a disparate treatment
challenge. Further, it is possible, perhaps probable, that MLS long
ago recognized, by way of the Bosman decision or otherwise, the
Policy’s impotence in satisfying the goals it purportedly existed to
satisfy. A showing that the Policy does not serve the purposes for
which it was ostensibly enacted and that, despite knowing this, the
MLS nonetheless enacted and enforced it, would certainly indicate
pretext.
Even if, however, a Court were to conclude: (1) that the Policy
serves legitimate non-discriminatory purposes; or (2) that the
Policy does not serve legitimate non-discriminatory purposes, but
that MLS sincerely believes it does serve such purposes, the
Court’s conclusion would not necessarily derail a plaintiff’s claim.
In 1991, the United States Congress amended the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 to permit mixed motive disparate treatment claims, which
allow plaintiffs to successfully challenge employment decisions
that are based on multiple factors. So, under a mixed motive
theory, a plaintiff may prevail upon showing that, in addition to
considering non-discriminatory factors, the defendant considered
the plaintiff’s race, color, gender, national origin, or religion, in
denying employment opportunities.182 A mixed motive approach,
therefore, would likely expand an international player’s prospects
for success.183
b. The “similarly situated” inquiry and the subjective
decision-maker
Whether a plaintiff pursues single motive or mixed motive
liability, courts do not, as noted supra, require from the plaintiff
direct discriminatory evidence.184 And assuming, as is often the
case, that no direct discriminatory evidence exists, courts are left to
of which applies against the salary cap. MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER, 2008 MLS
PLAYER RULES & REGULATIONS, supra note 1. Teams are permitted to trade
Designated Player slots so long as no team accrues any more than two such
slots. Id.
182
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90,
101-02 (2003).
183
Notably, a mixed motive theory provides limited relief. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g)(2)(B). A prevailing mixed-motive plaintiff would be entitled to
declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs, but not to hiring,
reinstatement, or damages.
184
See Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 99-100.
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consider the proffered evidence, and based thereupon, draw, or
decline to draw, an inference of discrimination.185 Whatever other
evidence comprises the record, the presiding court would focus
heavily on a comparison between the plaintiff who was denied
MLS employment as a player with a particular team and at least
one similarly situated white player who secured such employment,
with a favorable comparison suggesting pretext.186
Conducting a meaningful comparison, however, can be
challenging, particularly in the sports employment context.187
While some indicia of an athlete’s success or potential success,
such as speed and reaction time, are easily quantifiable, others,
such as willingness to sacrifice individual glory for the team’s
ultimate benefit, are not.188 And because entirely objective
assessment is not always possible, courts generally defer to
defendants’ subjective assessments.189 Such deference, of course,
impedes plaintiffs’ attempts to identify the assessments as
unlawfully discriminatory, which consequently hamstrings
individual plaintiffs’ Title VII disparate treatment actions.190 So,
while the Burdine burden-shifting framework exists to aid
individual plaintiffs in establishing intentional discrimination
claims, the deference routinely granted employers’ subjective
assessments ultimately tarnishes Burdine’s promise.
3.

Building the Race Discrimination Case: The Class
Action

Where, however, plaintiffs band together as a class to
challenge not just individual adverse employment decisions, but an
employer’s pattern or practice of organization-wide discrimination,
they are spared such defendant deference in attempting to prove
185

See Id. at 101 (Pursuant to Title VII, “a plaintiff need only present
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of
evidence that . . . [the protected characteristic] was a motivating factor for any
employment practice’”).
186
See Tricia M. Beckles, Class of One: Are Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs at an Insurmountable Disadvantage if They Have No “Similarly
Situated” Comparators?, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 459, 466 (2008)
(“Evidence of . . . pretext may include showing that a similarly situated
individual, outside the protected class, was treated more favorably); Holly A.
Williams, Reaching Across Difference: Extending Equality’s Reach to
Encompass Governmental Programs that Solely Benefit Women, 13 UCLA
WOMEN’S L. J. 375, 387 (2005) (“[I]n order to succeed on a claim of racial
discrimination brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
plaintiff must satisfy the similarly situated requirement . . . .”).
187
See Duru, supra note 4, at 378.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 404.
190
Id.
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liability. Recognizing the inefficiencies of Burdine-style analyses
for hundreds or thousands of class members as well as the dangers
of defendants prevailing in Title VII actions when discrimination
may exist throughout an organization but is not readily apparent on
the face of any particular employment decision, the Supreme
Court, in its 1977 Teamsters v. United States decision, created a
model of proof applicable in class cases.191 Rather than require the
fact-specific analysis crucial to individual plaintiffs’ disparate
treatment actions, the Teamsters Court called for statistical
analysis reflective of discrimination.192
Under Teamsters,
plaintiffs can create a presumption of discrimination through
showing that the percentage of a particular racial group in a
defendant’s workforce is smaller than the percentage of that racial
group in the broader labor market.193
Under Teamsters, therefore, international players of color who
are denied MLS roster positions and are unable to, or uninterested
in, pursuing individual disparate treatment actions by way of the
Burdine burden-shifting framework, might be advised to sue MLS
as a class.194 To create the presumption of discrimination,
191

Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337-40 (1977);
see also Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?,
37 AKRON L. REV. 813, 816-818 (2004); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86,
443 F.2d 544, 551 (1971) (“Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the courts have frequently relied upon statistical evidence to prove a violation….
In many cases the only available avenue of proof is the use of racial statistics to
uncover clandestine and covert discrimination by the employer or union
involved.”).
192
See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340 n.20 (“Statistics showing racial or ethnic
imbalance are probative in a case such as this one only because such imbalance
is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation, it is
ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time
result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic
composition of the population in the community from which employees are
hired.”).
193
Id. at 337-40; see also Michelle Adams, Causation and Responsibility in
Tort and Affirmative Action, 79 TEX. L. REV. 643, 688-690 (2001). The
appropriate contours of the relevant labor market used in conducting disparate
treatment statistical analysis unfailingly produces significant debate among
parties to an action. See Fred W. Alvarez, Michael J. Levy & Shirley C. Wang,
Class Actions and Pattern and Practice Claims: Overview of Theories,
Defenses, Settlements and the Government’s Activist Role, 591 PLI/LIT 275, 308
(1998).
Such debate would certainly ensue in this case, with the player
plaintiffs arguing for a relevant labor market rich in players of color and MLS
arguing for the inverse.
194
Whether players interested in launching a class action and representing
their fellow class members would meet the requirements of doing so would
depend on the players’ circumstances. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“FRCP”) 23(a), “One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
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however, the international players would need to prove a
statistically significant disproportionality between the number of
players of color in MLS and the number of players of color eligible
and qualified to play in MLS.195 Courts require statistical
significance to ensure the disparity’s scope is sufficient to suggest
intentional discrimination as opposed to coincidence.196
How to properly derive statistical significance, however, is a
matter of seemingly endless debate, and disparate treatment class
action cases, therefore, generally feature battling statisticians’
testimony on this score.197 Indeed, MLS would certainly challenge
whatever statistical analysis the international players produce “as
to the statistical test used, the assumptions employed in conducting
the test, and the conclusion the test suggests.”198 If, however, the
plaintiffs were to successfully set forth a statistically significant
disproportionality together with some accompanying anecdotal
evidence, they would likely establish Title VII liability.199 Doing
so would render injunctive relief appropriate,200 meaning a court
could enjoin MLS from effectuating the Policy. In addition, doing
so would create, in each plaintiff’s circumstance, a presumption of
discrimination and, therefore, an entitlement to damages, unless
MLS is able to show race was irrelevant to the particular player’s
rejection.201

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.”
195
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293 (1987).
196
Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. Rev. 91,
121 (2003).
197
See id.
198
Duru, supra note 4, at 403.
199
Although some courts have deemed a statistically significant showing
sufficient to establish Teamsters Title VII liability, see Sheet Metal Workers,
Local 36 v. United States, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969), other courts appear to
require some corroborative anecdotal evidence as well. See John Cocchi Day,
Retelling the Story of Affirmative Action: Reflections on a Decade of Federal
Jurisprudence in the Public Workplace, 89 CAL. L. REV. 59, 96-98 (2001).
200
See United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir
1970); Rowe v. Gen. Motors Corp. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir 1972).
201
Ellen M. Athas, Defendant’s Burden of Proof in Title VII Class Action
Disparate Treatment Suits, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 755, 778-79 (1982). Once the
presumption of discrimination is established, the court would launch a series of
mini-trials focusing on the specific facts of each member of the class, during
which the employer would carry the burden of showing, with respect to each
class member, that it did not discriminate. Id. at 779-780.
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B. The MLS Policy as Disparate Impact Discrimination
Absent an intentional discrimination showing, whether in the
individual or class context, plaintiffs may still prevail under Title
VII by way of disparate impact analysis. Recognizing both the
difficulty of proving discriminatory intent and discrimination’s
detrimental impact on society whatever its motivation, courts have
established that Title VII relief is potentially appropriate even in
cases of unintentional discrimination by way of disparate impact
claims.202
Disparate impact analysis, like disparate treatment analysis,
features a three-step burden-shifting framework, the first step of
which requires that plaintiffs establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.203 The nature of the required prima facie case in
the disparate impact context is, however, quite different than in the
disparate treatment context. Rather than proving protected class
status, qualification, and rejection under suspicious circumstances,
disparate impact plaintiffs’ prima facie cases generally consist of
statistics designed to show that a requirement of employment
disproportionately impacts members of a particular protected
group.204
For instance, in Griggs v. Duke Power, the case in which the
Supreme Court first recognized the Title VII disparate impact
theory, plaintiffs challenged Duke Power’s requirement that
employees in several of the company’s departments achieve a
threshold score on standardized examinations, through showing
that the requirement disproportionately disqualified black
candidates.205 Courts accept various methodological approaches to
this end.206 The Griggs plaintiffs presented applicant flow
analysis, comparing the proportion of black candidates in the
applicant pool who did not achieved the threshold score with the
proportion of black candidates who did achieve the score and thus

202
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (“good intent or
absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures . . .
that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to
measuring job capability”).
203
See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982).
204
Erik R. Sunde, Casenote, Civil Rights—Title VII Disparate Impact
Theory—Employer’s Burden of Rebutting Prima Facie Case Under Disparate
Impact Theory is One of Production While Ultimate Burden of Persuasion
Remains with Complainant, 21 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1081, 1087-88 (1990).
205
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32. Duke Power also required that the
employees in these departments had graduated from high school. Id at 427-28.
206
James P. Ratz, Casenote, Requiring Discriminatory Intent and Relevant
Statistical Evidence in Title VII Cases: Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 16 HAMLINE L. REV. 1003,
1018 (1993).
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qualified for employment.207 Another Supreme Court-sanctioned
methodological approach to establishing a disparate impact prima
facie case is external availability analysis, which, like the pattern
or practice disparate treatment statistical inquiry discussed above,
compares the composition of the employer’s workforce with that
of a relevant labor market.208
If plaintiffs were to succeed in marshalling data revealing that,
as a statistically significant matter, the Policy disproportionately
impacts black and Latino players, and if MLS were unable to
challenge the statistical model’s integrity or otherwise cast doubt
upon it, MLS would have the opportunity to show that the Policy is
job-related and is consistent with business necessity.209 The idea
behind this second step in the three-step disparate impact analysis
is that an employment requirement necessary to a business’
existence, even if disproportionately impactful, potentially merits
preservation.210 The job-related / business necessity inquiry is,
however, notoriously amorphous, with different courts applying
different standards.211 Whatever the standard, MLS would likely
turn to its justifications for implementing the Policy and argue that
the league’s financial success, as a matter of both salary control
and spectator support, necessarily requires international player
limits.
Plaintiffs would then have the opportunity to show that MLS
could have used a less discriminatory alternative than the
international player restriction to meet that necessity;212 for
instance, stringent league-wide salary restrictions together with
marketing campaigns calculated to familiarize American soccer
207

See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 n.14 (1977).
209
William Gordon, Recent Development, The Evolution of the Disparate
Impact Theory of Title VII: A Hypothetical Case Study, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
529, 530-31 (2007).
210
See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34; see Albermarle Paper Company v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
211
See, e.g., Zamlen v. City of Cleveland, 906 F.2d 209, 218 (6th Cir. 1990)
(testing will meet the business necessity burden where using a content validity
study demonstrates a direct relationship between the test contents and the job
contents.); Gillespie v. State of Wis., 771 F.2d 1035, 1040 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985)
(meeting the burden of job necessity requires a construct validity study to prove
that the challenged test is “adequately correlated with the applicant’s future job
performance.”); Ass’n of Mexican-American Educators v. Cal., 231 F.3d 572,
585 (9th Cir. 2000) (meeting the burden of production to prove job necessity
requires the employer to “first specify the particular trait . . . which the selection
advice is being used to identify or measure . . . then determine that the particular
trait . . . is an important element of work behavior[, and f]inally, the employer
must demonstrate by ‘professionally acceptable methods’ that the selection
device is ‘predictive of or significantly correlated’ with the element of work
behavior identified in the second step.”).
212
See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
208
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fans with international players. If the Court were to conclude
plaintiffs’ alternatives adequately serve MLS’ business need,
liability would become a possibility.213
While the likelihood of success for players challenging the
MLS Policy under a disparate impact theory would depend on,
among other things, the nature of their proffered statistics, the
contours of MLS’ response, and the court’s view of the business
necessity inquiry, the potential for success certainly exists.
At bottom, then, whether or not MLS intended that its Policy
discriminatorily erect race-based barriers of entry into the league,
the Policy has resulted in such barriers to entry and has, therefore,
served to exclude players of color. As such, the MLS Policy is
potentially vulnerable to Title VII attack, whether as intentionally
discriminatory or as resulting in a discriminatory disparate impact.
V. THE MLS POLICY, CONTEXTUALIZED – SURVEYING THE
AMERICAN SPORTING LANDSCAPE
While the MLS Policy’s impact and potential illegality must
necessarily concern a body politic which has rejected racial
discrimination, contextualizing the Policy and its implications on
the broader American sporting landscape unearths an even greater
concern. Such contextualization reveals that for the majority of
premier American sports leagues – particularly the NFL, the NHL,
and the NBA – disregard for citizenship status results in a
decreased proportion of black and Latino players or in the
maintenance of the league’s racial status quo, whereas in the MLS,
as discussed above, disregard for citizenship status would result in
an increased proportion of black and Latino players. That the
NFL, NHL, and NBA do not limit international entrants while
MLS does, therefore, suggests that, across much of the American
professional sporting landscape, a league’s decision in this regard
may rest to some extent on racial considerations. Analyses of
internationalization’s racial impact in the NFL, NHL, and NBA
follow.

213

Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1122-23 (1993) (finding that
the plaintiff’s proffered alternatives did not meet the employer’s business need
of safety, and thus did not fulfill the third prong of the disparate impact burden
shifting test). Some courts suggest that for plaintiffs to prevail at this stage of
the analysis, they must show the defendant was presented an appropriate
alternative and rejected it. Michael J. Zimmer, Individual Disparate Impact
Law: On the Plain Meaning of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 30 Loy. U. Chi. L.J.
473, 480-81 (1999).
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A. The National Football League
The NFL is unique among America’s premier sports leagues in
that football is a truly American sport. It is scarcely played outside
of North America, and although played in Canada, it is minimally
popular there.214 While the NFL sponsored the now-defunct World
League of American Football which operated in Europe for twelve
years and has held several exhibition games in other nations,
football has not taken hold internationally.215 Indeed, throughout
most of the world, the word “football” does not describe the NFL’s
product. Rather, “football” describes the game Americans call
soccer.216 The NFL’s product is more commonly known, outside
the United States, as “American football.”217 Further, with rare, if
any, exception, the world’s best football players are American and
already play in the NFL or at American universities.218 NFL teams
simply do not mine for talent in other countries – as many teams in
America’s other premier sports leagues do –219 and no other
country boasts a football league sufficiently strong to regularly
produce promising NFL prospects.220 As such, any sort of NFL
214

Indeed, Canada’s Football League, the CFL, “has struggled to define
itself over the past 20 years and franchises are happy to break even from year to
year.” COLIN HOWEL, BLOOD, SWEAT, AND CHEERS: SPORT AND THE MAKING
OF MODERN CANADA 79 (Craig Heron ed. University of Toronto Press Inc.,
2001).
215
Prior to the start of the 1998 season, the World League of American
Football changed its name to NFL Europe in an effort to strengthen the link
between American football and Europe. NFL Europa History,
http://www.nfl.com/europa/history (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
216
See David Reisman & Reuel Denney, Football in America: A study in
cultural diffusion, 3 AMERICAN QUARTERLY 309, 312 (1951).
217
See GERHARD FALK, FOOTBALL AND AMERICAN IDENTITY 7 (2005).
218
See Kenneth L. Shropshire, Minority Issues in Contemporary Sports, 15
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 189, 192 (2004).
219
For years, MLB, NBA, and NHL teams have actively searched
internationally for players. MLB teams generally maintain fully operational
baseball training academies in Latin America, see infra note 314, and NBA and
NHL teams routinely employ scouts to focus on identifying international talent.
See Overseas Players Courted by N.B.A., N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2005, available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/26/sports/basketball/26flair.html
(last
visited Feb. 1, 2009); see Keith Loria, Boom or Bust?, HOCKEY DIGEST,
Summer 2003, at 62 (highlighting the priority that NHL commissioner Gary
Bettman places on acquiring international players).
220
The CFL has on occasion produced players who went on to successful
careers in the NFL. Perhaps chief among them is NFL Hall of Fame
quarterback Warren Moon, who played for years with the CFL’s Edmonton
Eskimos before joining the NFL’s Houston Oilers and then, later in his career,
the Seattle Seahawks, and Kansas City Chiefs. WILLIAM C. RHODEN, THIRD
AND A MILE: THE TRIALS AND TRIUMPHS OF THE BLACK QUARTERBACK: AN
ORAL HISTORY 142-43 (2007). Notably, Moon, who was an American
collegiate star at the University of Washington displayed the ability to play
quarterback on the NFL level, but because of his race was not drafted by any of
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citizenship discrimination policy would have, at most, a negligible
impact on player entry into the league and would, therefore, not
meaningfully alter the league’s racial demographics. Thus, NFL
citizenship discrimination would ultimately neither increase nor
decrease the league’s proportion of players of color – it would
have no appreciable impact. 221

B. The National Hockey League
The NHL presents a far different context than the NFL.
Whereas the NFL is overwhelmingly populated by Americans, the
NHL is overwhelmingly populated by non-Americans. From its
very inception in 1917, Canadians dominated the NHL.222 And for
much of the twentieth century, this remained the case.223 During
the 1970’s, however, European players began trickling into the
league, and with the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 and the
Eastern Bloc’s consequent dissolution, the trickle became a

the NFL’s teams. Id. at 130. Moon is African-American, and for decades NFL
teams, perhaps saddled with stereotypes of African American intellectual
inferiority, seemed to reserve the quarterback spot – “football’s thinking and
control position” – for whites. See RICHARD LAPCHICK, SMASHING BARRIERS:
RACE AND SPORT IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 229 (2001). While equal
employment opportunity at the quarterback position has increased since Moon’s
playing days, black quarterbacks remain disproportionately rare. N. Jeremi
Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, the Rooney Rule, and the Quest to "Level the
Playing Field" in the National Football League, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J 179,
184 (2008). As of the 2007 NFL season, although blacks comprised sixty-seven
percent of the league’s players, they comprised only twenty percent of the
league’s quarterbacks. Id.
Issues of race aside, successful CFL transplants into the NFL are
exceedingly rare, and like Moon, such transplants generally are American
citizens and would thus be unimpacted by any NFL citizenship discrimination
policy.
See
2007
Rogers
CFL
Player
Awards,
http://www.tsn.ca/cfl/feature/?id=10868 (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) (The 2007
CFL Most Outstanding Player, Defensive Player, Offensive Lineman, Rookie,
and Special Teams player awards were dominated by the United States with
Americans winning four of five awards and finishing runner-up in all five.).
221
This is not to suggest that NFL teams are indifferent to, or ambivalent
about, demographic trends. Indeed, one sports columnist argued that NFL teams
have recently begun, and will, in the future, continue, to intentionally reduce
their numbers of black players. Jason Whitlock, Buffoons Leaving Terrible
Legacy, Oct. 19, 2007, http://profootballexperts.scout.com/2/692467.html. (last
visited Feb. 1, 2009).
222
Terry Wu & Neil Longley, The Applicability of NAFTA to the
Subsidization of U.S.-Based NHL Teams: Legal and Economic Perspectives, 9
L. & BUS. REV. AM. 571, 574 (2003).
223
Id.
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torrent.224 By 2002, one-third of the league’s players were
European.225 Whether Canadian or European, however, foreign
hockey players unquestionably predominate in the NHL.226
Indeed, although the league is a United States corporation with its
headquarters in New York City and with twenty-four of its thirty
teams based in American cities,227 only nineteen percent of NHL
players are American.228
Unlike in the NFL context, therefore, the impact of an NHL
policy substantially limiting international players’ involvement
would be extreme. Scores of NHL players would be expurgated,
and the league would present a drastically different brand of
hockey. There would certainly exist players to fill the vacated
roster spots, as scores of Americans play hockey in competitive
university programs.229 However, in that American players are, on
the whole, regarded as less talented than their foreign
counterparts,230 the league’s level of play would drop. The NHL
would, in essence, become much like MLS – a league presenting
an athletic product deemed comparatively inferior by global
standards.
Interestingly, such a policy overhaul would produce in the
NHL the very benefits the MLS claims motivate its Policy. The
NHL and its teams would, of course, no longer labor so
strenuously under the weight of their international stars’ enormous
224

See Brian Ward, The National Hockey League’s Collective Bargaining
Agreement: Its Inadequacies in Dealing with League Internationalization, 23
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV.747, 760 (2000).
225
Wu & Longley, supra note 222, at 574.
226
ALAIN HACHE, ANALYSIS OF THE NHL PLAYERS BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH 1
(2006),
http://www.thephysicsofhockey.com/documents/country.pdf.
(last
visited Feb. 1, 2009).
227
The remaining six NHL franchises are based in the Canadian cities of
Calgary, Edmonton, Ottawa, Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver. See NHL
TEAMS, http://www.nhl.com/teams/index.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
228
HACHE, supra note 226.
229
See
Division
I
Men’s
Ice
Hockey,
http://web1.ncaa.org/onlineDir/exec/sponsorship?sortOrder=0&division=1&spor
t=MIH (last visited Feb. 1, 2009) (listing 58 NCAA Division I hockey
programs);
Division
II
Men’s
Ice
Hockey,
http://web1.ncaa.org/onlineDir/exec/sponsorship?sortOrder=0&division=2&spor
t=MIH (last visited Feb. 1, 2009) (listing 7 NCAA Division II programs);
Division
III
Men’s
Ice
Hockey,
http://web1.ncaa.org/onlineDir/exec/sponsorship?sortOrder=0&division=3&spor
t=MIH (last visited Feb. 1, 2009) (listing 83 NCAA Division III programs).
230
See Terry Frei, Now more than ever, the American hockey player has
options,
Sep.
7,
2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/columns/story?columnist=frei_terry&id=3008373
(last visited Feb. 1, 2009) (noting that American-born NHL players have
historically played in the Canadian major junior leagues before the NHL
because the NHL had traditionally been “heavily biased in favor of Canadian
major junior products”).
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salaries.231 In addition, an increased proportion of Americans in
the league would, under MLS’ reasoning, serve to maintain the
interest of spectators desiring to see Americans play. The NHL’s
financial woes are well-documented,232 and, as such, potential
increases in spectatorship and decreases in salary burdens would
appear quite attractive.
Furthermore, securing roster spots for Americans would ensure
that the NHL serves as a training ground for a larger group of
potential national team players If, indeed, international player
restrictions improve a national team, as MLS suggests they do, the
NHL would seem a prime candidate for such restrictions. The
NHL, however, takes a different approach to building the national
team and has achieved substantial success in doing so. The NHL
pursues the precise approach the Bosman Court recommended in
dismissing the Bosman defendants’ arguments in favor of
nationality restrictions. With no international player restrictions,
only the American players good enough to successfully compete
with foreign players for roster spots on the NHL’s teams play in
the league. The result has been an average of four American
players per NHL team,233 but those players consistently play
against the world’s best, and the United States National Hockey
Team has, not surprisingly, achieved considerable success.234
Despite these purported potential benefits of restricting
international entrants – benefits upon which MLS ostensibly bases
its Policy – the NHL does not limit the number of international
players permitted in the league or on a particular team, suggesting
that other considerations – perhaps considerations of racial
proportionality, which have no relevance in the NHL context –
motivate international player restrictions in the MLS context.
231

Nine of the ten highest salaries for NHL’s 2007-08 season were paid to
international
players.
See
Top
25
players,
http://content.usatoday.com/sports/hockey/nhl/salaries/top25.aspx?year=200708 (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
232
See Al Strachan, NHL’s Financial system is as broken as ever, FOX
SPORTS, July 10, 2008, http://msn.foxsports.com/nhl/story/8331258 (last visited
Feb. 1, 2009); Mike Brehm, Study backs NHL’s claim of major financial losses,
USA TODAY, Feb. 2, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/hockey/nhl/200402-12-finances-study_x.htm. (last visited Feb. 1, 2009)
233
See Frei, supra note 230.
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See
World
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Hockey
1996
Summary,
http://www.hhof.com/html/GamesSummaryWCUP1996.shtml (last visited Feb.
1, 2009) (summarizing the United States’ gold medal win); USA Hockey
Olympic
Men’s
Teams,
http://wwa.usahockey.com//Template_Usahockey.aspx?NAV=TU_01_01&ID=
21634 (last visited Feb. 1, 2009) (listing US Olympic performance, including a
silver medal in 2002); Ice Hockey World Championship Prague 2004,
http://www.prague.cz/hockey.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2009) (listing the United
States as the bronze medal winner of the 2004 World Championships).
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While imposing international player restrictions where none
previously existed would present a host of logistical challenges, it
is certainly possible that the NHL, if faced with a talent pool
dominated by international hockey players of color, might view
internationalization differently and impose such restrictions. It is
similarly possible that were soccer as racially homogeneous a sport
as hockey, MLS might view internationalization differently and
opt against such restrictions. One can only speculate as to how
each league would react in the other’s racial context. In light of
the aforementioned racial dynamics that continue to pervade
American sport, however, to dismiss the possibility that racial
considerations might impact those reactions would be a mistake.
C. The National Basketball Association
The NBA presents yet another context, different in meaningful
ways from both the NFL and the NHL. For decades after the
NBA’s founding in 1946, the NBA was much like the NFL: a
league of Americans playing a game more popular in America than
elsewhere in the world. As addressed in detail below, however,
beginning in the early 1990’s, NBA teams’ rosters have grown
increasingly international.235 So, as in the NHL context, NBA
international player restrictions would significantly alter the
league. The impact of the alteration on the NBA’s racial
demographics would, however, be quite different than in the NHL
context. Whereas virtually all of the NHL’s domestic players as
well as its international players are white,236 the NBA’s
international players are overwhelmingly white,237 and its domestic
players are overwhelmingly of color.238 Disregard for citizenship
status in the NBA, therefore, results in a substantially larger white
presence among NBA players than would otherwise be the case.
And, perhaps for this reason, the NBA has enthusiastically
embraced internationalization.
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See text accompanying footnotes 279-83, infra.
Kevin Allen, Willie O’Ree Still Blazing Way in NHL 50 Years Later,
USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 2008, at 1C (noting the NHL has only twelve black
players).
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Richard Lapchick, Money Speaks Louder than Race, May 10, 2004,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=lapchick/040510 (last visited
Feb. 1, 2009) (noting that 68% of the NBA’s international players are white)
238
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a
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1. The NBA’s Black Eye: Race, Hip Hop, and Hatred
As noted in Part IV.A.1. of this article, there has long existed in
the NBA, which has a larger percentage of black players than any
of the other premier American professional sports leagues, an ugly
racial dynamic.239 Fans and team owners alike have expressed
preferences for white players and teams have made player
personnel decisions accordingly, particularly with regard to reserve
players. In recent years, this documented desire among the NBA’s
white fans for “seeing white players”240 seems to have merged with
a strong distaste for expressions of hip-hop culture and, thus, for
the young black athletes who embody it. Hip-hop, a term often
simplistically utilized as a synonym for rap music, is in fact a
complex multi-faceted phenomenon born in New York City during
the late 1970’s, which encompasses music, dance, art, style of
dress, and perspective.241 In the decades since its emergence, hiphop culture has spread beyond New York City to other American
urban areas, throughout middle-America, and ultimately across
much of the world.242 Indeed, hip-hop culture has so pervaded
American culture that Fortune 500 companies routinely utilize it to
market products of all sorts.243
Still, although various commercial enterprises as well as
individuals from various nations, of various races, and representing
all walks of life, embrace hip-hop culture, hip-hop culture finds
itself monolithized and caricatured as young, black, irreverent in
dress and manner, and potentially criminal.244 And, among
substantial sectors of the American sports-watching public, there
has seemingly developed an intense revulsion to this hip-hop
caricature, which applies to athletes viewed – correctly or
incorrectly – as reflecting it, whatever the athletes’ attributes.
Several years ago, in a Sports Illustrated magazine column,
journalist Rick Reilly exposed this revulsion and its prejudicial
239

See Duru, supra note 4, at 395-96.
Brown, Keenan & Spiro, supra note 131, at 343.
241
See Greg Dimitriadis, Hip Hop: From Live Performance to Mediated
Narrative, 15 POPULAR MUSIC 179, 179-180 (1996). (“Early MCs (or ‘rappers’)
and DJs, graffiti artists and breakdancers, forged a ‘scene’ entirely dependent
upon face-to-face social contact and interaction . . . [and it] was intrinsic to hip
hop culture”).
242
See IMANI PERRY, PROPHETS OF THE Hood 19, 23 (2004).
243
See David Kiley, Hip Hop Gets Down with the Deals, BUSINESS WEEK
ONLINE,
May
16,
2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/may2005/nf20050516_5797_db
016.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2009). Hip-hop culture is an extraordinarily
complex phenomenon deserving of far greater attention than this piece can
provide. For an in-depth treatment of hip-hop culture, see generally PERRY,
supra note 242.
244
See PERRY, supra note 233, at 109.
240
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danger.245 Reilly begins the column by asking the reader to close
his or her eyes while Reilly describes an NBA legend.246 Reilly
then launches the description:
Compared with the rest of today’s superstars, he’s small –
mostly heart and scabs – but as tough as a ’48 pickup. . . . He
could carry an offense, a team, a city by himself. One night he
would torch an opponent for 50 points and the next decide to
beat the opposition with assists. He was unpredictable,
unguardable and unforgettable. . . . He was the idol of millions
around the world, one of the three greatest players of his day. .
. . He was shy with the press, yet honest as a Sunday
confessional. He dressed the same every day and was mocked
for it. . . . This guy had the 100,000-watt smile of a lotto
winner. He had the joy of the game in his blood, and he knew
how to spread it.247

Having described the player, Reilly explains that the player is
not Jerry West or Michael Jordan or John Stockton or Magic
Johnson – all widely respected and revered NBA stars who, in
some respects, fit the description.248 The player, he states, is the
much-maligned former Philadelphia 76er, and current Detroit
Piston, Allen Iverson.249 “That changes everything, doesn’t it?”
asks Reilly, “Now you see the cornrows and the tattoos and the
pierce-holes dripping gold, and they bug you, right? You think
thug and rapper and criminal. . . .”250
Reilly penned his column in reaction to the deluge of hate mail
Sports Illustrated received after Iverson appeared shirtless,
tattooed, bejeweled, and expressionless on the magazine’s cover.
Among the readers’ complaints:
•
•
•

•
•

“The cover with Allen Iverson made me sick to
my stomach . . . ;”
“Those preening idiots barely belong to the
human race . . . ”
“The stare, the tattoos and pants to the waist
showing his jockstrap sum up the reason I have
not watched an NBA game in years . . . ”
“The picture of Allen Iverson is revolting . . . ”
“I object to this irreverent picture.”251

245

Rick Reilly, Looks Aren’t Everything, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 22,
2001, at 94.
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
Id.
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Notably, the irate readers were objecting neither to the feature
story on Iverson, nor to his being on the magazine’s cover.252 Nor
were they objecting to the sight of a shirtless athlete; indeed, such
photographs are commonplace in sports magazines.253 Readers
objected to the particular manner in which Iverson appeared – as
he felt most comfortable, in Reilly’s words, “hip-hop to his
heart.”254
Reilly argued that fans were anxious to enjoy the skill,
athleticism, and determination of Iverson, but not his particular
expression of hip-hop culture. They desired the basketball
prowess, Reilly insisted, but in a more palatable package. The
NBA has clearly recognized what Reilly expressed, and, without
question, has responded to the fans’ desire – initially with regard to
Iverson alone and eventually pursuant to league-wide rule.
Regarding Iverson, the NBA was so concerned about his
appearance that when it featured him on the cover of its Hoop
Magazine, the league literally stripped him of the potentially
offending accoutrements.255
The magazine editors, without
252

Complaints on either ground would have been understandable as Iverson
has, during the course of his career, developed a reputation as a “bad boy” as
well as “a misogynist, homophobic, violent ego-maniac.” Same Old Iverson?
Look
Again
(Associated
Press),
Nov.
11,
2000,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/basketball/nba/news/2000/11/11/iverson_ap/inde
x.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2009); Comments of Michael Wilbon, The Tony and
Mike
Show,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/liveonline/00/sports/tkwilbon/tkwilbon101300.htm (last visited Feb. 1,
2009).
253
Indeed, less than two months earlier, Sports Illustrated featured MLB
player Nomar Garciapparra shirtless on its cover. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 5,
2001, cover page.
254
Reilly, supra note 245, at 94. Reilly’s description of Iverson’s
appearance as “hip-hop to his heart” should not be taken to suggest Iverson’s
appearance is any more reflective of hip-hop culture than an entirely dissimilar
appearance. For instance, Grammy-award winning hip-hop artist Kanye West
famously favors “preppy” designer clothing. See Kanye West to Launch
Clothing
Line,
http://www.manchic.com/manchic/2005/09/kanye_west_to_l.html (last visited
Feb. 1, 2009); Mike Pattenden, Kanye West’s Extraordinary LA Wardrobe,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/moslive/article-486092/Kanye-Wests-extraordinaryLA-wardrobe.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2009) (describing West as a “fashion
revolutionary” and detailing aspects of his expansive wardrobe). While West,
attired in “preppy” clothing, is no less reflective of hip-hop culture than Iverson
at his most comfortable, Iverson’s image is reasonably viewed as more reflective
of the hip-hop caricature than West’s.
255
Rick Reilly, Still in there Chuckin’, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 18,
2000, at 180. Although NBA Commissioner David Stern reprimanded the Hoop
Magazine editor-in-chief after the issue’s publication, see Mike Wise, Pro
Basketball – In the Paint, N. Y. TIMES, June 4, 2003, at D4, the Hoop Magazine
incident was not the first instance of an NBA publication attempting to decouple
Iverson from his tattoos. Indeed, just a year earlier, the NBA’s Inside Stuff
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Iverson’s knowledge, airbrushed away his diamond earrings, his
necklace and several of his tattoos.256
a. Legislating an Image Overhaul
Unable, of course, to airbrush away the tattoos, jewelry and
hip-hop inspired outerwear of an increasing number of players
bedecked as Iverson often was, the NBA, in 2005, took a more
broad-based approach to re-packaging its players. It instituted a
dress code seemingly aimed at, among other things, suppressing
hip-hop expression.257
While the NBA’s drive to systematically alter its image began
years earlier, a dramatic brawl during a game between the league’s
Detroit Pistons and Indiana Pacers catalyzed its action.258 During
the fight, members of the Pacers entered the stands and fought with

Magazine published an Iverson picture with one of his tattoos “strategically
cropped out of the photo.” Darren Rovell, Iverson Has Given NBA New
Credibility,
February
26,
2003,
http://espn.go.com/nba/s/2003/0226/1514649.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
256
Reilly, supra note 255, at 180. Iverson strongly objected to the NBA’s
attempt to accept some components of his person which rejecting others,
explaining, “[the photo] was an insult, terrible . . . . I wish they wouldn’t use me
at all if they can’t accept all of me.” Allen Iverson Live, Tattoos,
http://www.alleniversonlive.com/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&
cid=7&pid=30 (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
257
Mike Wise, Opinions on the NBA’s Dress Code Are Far From Uniform,
WASH POST, Oct. 23, 2005, at A1; NBA Dress Code Upsets Black Stars, Oct. 31,
2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/other_sports/basketball/4392182.stm (last
visited Feb. 1, 2009) (noting, however, that NBA Commissioner David Stern
argues the dress code is not aimed at hip-hop dress, but at “sloppy” dress).
258
HARVEY ARATON, CRASHING THE BORDERS: HOW BASKETBALL WON
THE WORLD AND LOST ITS SOUL AT HOME 175 (2005). A more recent set of
incidents that sullied the NBA’s reputation were the activities surrounding the
NBA’s All-Star Weekend celebration in Las Vegas in February of 2007.
Disparagingly dubbed “hip-hop Woodstock,” the weekend was derided as a hiphop criminal romp and a disgrace to the NBA. See Bill Simmons, Welcome to
hip-hop
Woodstock,
Feb.
22,
2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=simmons/070220 (last visited
Feb. 1, 2009). ESPN journalist Scoop Jackson, while acknowledging the
existence of hooliganism during the All-Star Weekend celebration, describes the
media coverage of the incidents – much like the media coverage of the NBA
generally – as racially-infused, unfairly critical of hip-hop culture, and
exaggerative. Scoop Jackson, What Really Happened in Vegas?, Feb. 28, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=jackson/070228 (last visited
Feb. 1, 2009). Jackson notes that the arrest totals during the weekend were
indeed high, but were dwarfed by arrest totals during a similarly festive event
just two months earlier – the Las Vegas New Year’s Eve celebration. Id.
Jackson attributes the disparity in concern over the two episodes of lawlessness
to racial prejudice and, more particularly, a racially-inspired distaste for NBA
culture. Id.
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some Pistons fans.259 The players were black, the fans were white,
and the battle, in many ways, metaphorically symbolized the
distance and disassociation between the NBA’s overwhelmingly
white game-attendees and its overwhelmingly black players.260
NBA Commissioner David Stern, who, in the fight’s wake,
reportedly expressed significant concern that the league “was
experiencing disconnect from red-state America,” acted quickly.261
He hired Matthew Dowd, “a Texas-based business strategist who
had helped shape George W. Bush’s [2004 presidential] reelection
campaign, to create a blueprint for the league on broadening its
appeal.”262
Within a year, the NBA legislated a number of restrictions on
player attire while players were “involved in team or league
business,” which is to say while players were traveling to and from
games and practices and, if not in uniform, while they were present
at games and practices.263 Specifically, players were prohibited
from, among other things, wearing sleeveless shirts, untucked
shirts, shorts and visible medallions.264 Taken together, these
restrictions achieved, on a league-wide level, what Hoop
Magazine’s airbrushing achieved with regard to Iverson alone.
The restrictions hid tattoos, covered jewelry, and, in addition,
rendered obsolete the oversized throwback athletic jerseys and
baggy pants many players favored.
The dress code sparked various reactions. Many observers
viewed the code as eminently reasonable.265 Others, including
259

Greg Sandoval, Charges to be Filed in Pistons-Pacers Brawl: Officials
Say Fans, Players Will Be Held Accountable, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2004, at
D7.
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Harvey Araton, One Year After Pacers-Pistons Fight, Tough Questions
of Race and Sports, NY TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, at 1. (discussing the PacersPistons brawl and referencing the steadily increasing “gulf” between the NBA’s
white fans and its black players).
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ARATON, supra note 258, at 175.
262
Central to the NBA’s strategy was pressing the National Basketball
Players Association (NBPA) – the union representing NBA players – to accede
to a minimum age requirement for NBA players. Id. The NBPA ultimately
agreed, and beginning in 2006, the league decreed that a player must be at least
nineteen years old and one year removed from high school before he may be
eligible for the NBA draft. Brian Shaffer, The NBA’s Age Requirement Shoots
and Misses: How the Non-Statutory Exemption Produces Inequitable Results for
High School Basketball Stars, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 681, 682 (2008).
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Michael McCann, The Reckless Pursuit of Dominion: A Situational
Analysis of the NBA and Diminishing Player Autonomy, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 819, 827 (2006); NBA adopts ‘business casual’ dress code, Oct. 18, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=2194537 (last visited Feb. 1,
2009).
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NBA adopts ‘business casual’ dress code, supra note 263.
265
McCann, supra note 263, at 829 (noting the broad-based support the
NBA dress code has engendered); Richard Lapchick, NBA Diversity Makes for a
Pretty
Big
Picture,
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many NBA players, viewed the code as unduly restrictive and
racially motivated.266 Whatever the merits of these arguments and
whatever the merits of the code, the code clearly took aim at a
form of hip-hop expression and the players embracing it.267
b. Pursuing a Personnel Overhaul?
While the code served to, at least in some respects and for
certain time periods, remove the trappings of this form of hip-hop
expression from hip-hop influenced players, author Jason Whitlock
identifies a more dangerous movement to weaken the hip-hop
influence on professional sport: systematic racial employment
discrimination. Whitlock suggests some NFL teams, having
concluded that athletes embracing hip-hop culture are “[bad] for
business” and “don’t contribute to a consistent winning
environment,” have, to avoid such players, intentionally “whitened
their rosters.”268 What is more, Whitlock predicts that, as a
consequence of this movement, within ten years, the proportion of
black players in the NFL will drop by twenty percent – from 70
percent to 50 percent.269
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/columns/story?columnist=lapchick_richard&id=2
865144 (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
266
McCann, supra note 263, at 827; Jamie Wilson, NBA’s “No Bling”
Dress Code Prompts Racism Accusation, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 31, 2005,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/oct/31/usa.americansports
(last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
267
McCann, supra note 263, at 827-28; Marc Lamont Hill, The Barbershop
Notebooks: Thoughts on the NBA Dress Code, Dec. 23, 2005,
http://www.popmatters.com/columns/hill/051223.shtml (last visited Feb. 1,
2009) (“The new NBA dress code . . . is clearly and unapologetically directed
toward suppressing hip-hop culture). Although the NBA seeks to suppress hiphop through the dress code, when marketing its hip-hop image proves
monetarily beneficial, the NBA seems anxious to do so. For instance, the NBA
has licensed a “a videogame called ‘NBA Ballers,’ which pitches itself as “the
exclusive one-on-one basketball videogame highlighting the ‘bling-bling’
lifestyle of NBA superstars.” McCann, supra note 263, at 828 (quoting
Hoopsvibe.com,
NBA
Videogames:
NBA
Ballers,
http://www.hoopsvibe.com/nba_video_games/nba_ballers-ar12627.html
(last
visited Feb. 1, 2009). The NBA’s own head coaches have recognized and
assailed the NBA’s hypocrisy regarding hip-hop. Id. San Antonio Spurs head
coach Gregg Popovich, for example, has said “on one hand, you’re endorsing
the culture, and on the other hand, you’re trying to block the culture. It sounds
almost duplicitous.” Id. (quoting Peter May, Polishing Reputation is a
Fashionable Trend, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 1, 2005, at E1).
268
Whitlock, supra note 221. Whitlock points specifically to the
Indianapolis Colts and the New England Patriots, which at the start of the 2007
NFL season had, respectively, twenty-five and twenty-three non-black players.
Id. Whether calculated or not, Whitlock argues, their “whitening” has
contributed to their success. Id.
269
Distressingly, Whitlock seeks to justify this potential demographic shift.
He identifies the negative behaviors of seven black NFL players he believes to
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Whether Whitlock’s prediction will come to pass in the NFL is
untold. However, considering the NBA’s history of customerinspired race-considered roster construction, the last decade’s
groundswell of opposition among game-attending NBA fans to
hip-hop culture’s influence, and the NBA’s myriad attempts,
through technological manipulation and attire restrictions, to quash
this culture embraced by many of its black players, the future
Whitlock predicts would seem welcome among the NBA brass.
This possibility is, however, a frightening one in that it would
signal a disregard for one of Title VII’s most fundamental
premises: individuals should not be denied employment
opportunities based on racially-inspired stereotypes.270
Under Title VII, while terminating or refusing to hire players
who engage in rule-breaking conduct, whatever their backgrounds
or associations, may be justifiable, terminating or refusing to hire
players who embrace hip-hop culture for fear of an increased
propensity to engage in rule-breaking conduct is not. Therefore, if
a team terminates or refuses to hire players who are black under
the assumption that the players embrace hip-hop culture, the
players would clearly have viable Title VII disparate treatment
claims against the team. If, on the other hand, the team effectuates
a facially race-neutral policy to terminate or refuse to hire players
who embrace hip-hop culture because the team assumes the
players will be troublemakers, the players would be able to argue
under Title VII’s disparate impact theory that the facially raceneutral policy has a disproportionate impact on black players.
Either way, NBA teams discovered to be doing what Whitlock
predicts would face both potential Title VII liability and a public
relations disaster.
2.

Lightening the Eye: Internationalization as Cure

The NBA and its teams, however, may, through
internationalization, be progressing toward a future consistent with
Whitlock’s prediction in a manner unassailable under either
disparate treatment or disparate impact analysis.271
embrace hip-hop, holds those negative behaviors against all other black NFL
players who may embrace hip-hop, monolithizes the entire group as the “hiphop athletes” and, essentially calls for their expurgation. Id.
270
The EEOC’s guidelines explain, “Title VII . . . prohibits employment
decisions based on stereotypes and assumptions about abilities, traits, or the
performance of individuals of certain racial groups.” See U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity
Commission,
Race/Color
Discrimination,
http://eeoc.gov/types/race.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
271
While the NBA would seemingly be just as pleased, or perhaps more
pleased, to increase the numbers of talented white Americans in the league,
white foreign players are, on the whole, substantially better players than their
white American counterparts. Michael Wilbon, An Issue that Follows the NBA
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In 1992, the United States National Men’s Basketball team,
stocked with NBA stars and dubbed the “Dream Team,”
demolished all of its opponents en route to winning the Olympic
Gold Medal in Barcelona, Spain.272 Even then, however, astute
observers, including the Dream Team’s coach Chuck Daly,
realized the level of play internationally, and particularly in
Europe, was quickly improving.273 Moreover, armed with the
lessons learned from experiencing and watching the “Dream
Team’s” triumph in Barcelona, players from around the world
further improved.274 Within several years of the 1992 Olympics,
other nations’ basketball teams had reached the Americans’ level,
and the United States was no longer routinely annihilating
international opponents.275
Ultimately, at the 2002 Fédération Internationale de
Basketball (FIBA) World Championships, the United States
suffered its first loss after fifty-eight consecutive victories, and
finished the tournament out of medal contention.276 Two years
later, at the 2004 Olympic Games, the United States team was
again embarrassed, suffering a “three-defeat flameout.”277 Over
the course of just twelve years, American basketball “supremacy
had given way to superiority, then to survival, and, finally, to
submission.”278
Like a White Shadow, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2006, at E06. Washington Post and
ESPN journalist Michael Wilbon attributes this disparity to culture and
confidence. Id. White American children, Wilbon states, are routinely led to
believe they cannot compete with black American children on basketball courts
and are guided away from the game. Id. Wilbon suggests that white children
from other nations, unburdened by the assumption of basketball inferiority that
so hampers white American children, allow themselves to develop as basketball
players in a way white American children do not. Id.
272
Araton, supra note 258, at 45, 52 (“After a game or two [in the
qualifying rounds], it was obvious that only a biblical act could beat the Dream
Team[.]”). At the Olympic Games four years earlier, the United States National
Basketball team, which then and theretofore was comprised of collegiate, rather
than professional, players suffered an embarrassing semi-final loss to the Soviet
Union, after which the “American basketball establishment” determined it
would field NBA players in international competitions going forward. Id.
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Id. at 48.
274
Id. at 136. The Dream Team’s Olympic campaign, in addition to
inspiring its opponents to improve, is credited with generally “boosting
international interest [in basketball] to an entirely new level.” Renada
Rutmanis, Foreign Players and the Globalization of Basketball, in BASKETBALL
IN AMERICA: FROM THE PLAYGROUNDS TO JORDAN’S GAME AND BEYOND 165,
167 (B. Batchelor ed., 2005).
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Araton, supra note 258, at 133-35 (detailing the United States’ narrow
win over Lithuania in the 2000 Olympic semi-final round).
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Id. at 145.
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Id. at 170-71
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Id. at 145. In 2006, the United States National Men’s Basketball Team
again lost in major international competition, this time to Greece in the
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Unsurprisingly, as basketball has improved world-wide,
foreign players have, in ever-increasing numbers, begun to ply
their trade in the NBA, the world’s most competitive and
potentially lucrative basketball proving ground.279 “What began as
a trickle [of international players entering the NBA] has turned into
a flood.”280 Whereas international players constituted only six
percent of the NBA in 1993,281 by 2008, their numbers had
increased three-fold.282 As noted above, while some of these
players are of color, the overwhelming majority of them are
white.283 Notably, these white foreign players are generally not
NBA also-rans, but are instead some of the NBA’s elites.284
semifinals of the FIBA World Championships. Bruce Wallace, Greece Takes
Air Out of U.S. Basketball, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2006, at D10. By the time the
team prepared for the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, China, it had performed below
expectations in international competition for so long that that it adopted the
moniker “The Redeem Team.” Joe Posnanski, For U.S. basketball team, a
tough task ahead, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 9 , 2008, at 1.
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signed with the NBA.” Rachel Cohen, Childress Leaves Hawks to Sign with
Greek Club, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 24, 2008, available at
http://news.findlaw.com/ap_stories/s/2030/07-242008/20080724052009_12.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2009) (discussing the
decision of NBA player Josh Childress to leave the Atlanta Hawks and join
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25, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=3501488 (last visited
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for European teams during the 2008 offseason).
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Daniel Eisenberg, The NBA’s Global Game Plan, TIME, Mar. 17, 2003,
at 59. While substantial numbers of foreign players did not enter the NBA until
the 1980’s, it bears noting that “foreign players have always been a part of the
NBA.” Rutmanis, supra note 274 at 166 (noting that “[i]n the very first game of
the [NBA’s] 1946-1947 season, an Italian-Canadian named Hank Arcado
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ARATON, supra note 258, at 141. As of the 2004 NBA season, 46 of the
68 international players in the NBA were white. Richard Lapchick, supra note
237.
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Indeed, the NBA’s Most Valuable Player (“MVP”) during the 20042005 and 2005-2006 seasons was Steve Nash, a Canadian. See NBA Postseason
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Basketball prowess alone, however, does not explain the
NBA’s rapid internationalization or the vigor with which the NBA
has embraced it over the course of the last decade.285 As Professor
Richard Lapchick, Chair of the DeVos Sport Business
Management Graduate Program at the University of Central
Florida, explains, the NBA’s internationalization movement is
economically driven.286 For starters, a significant and increasing
percentage of NBA merchandise sales, which provide the NBA
hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue, now occur abroad.287
In addition, as Professor Lapchick points out, “[f]ans pay to see
winning teams and good basketball. If an international player
makes a team better, it’s good for the team and good for the
game.”288 While these motivations must surely inspire the NBA’s
ambition to internationalize, another economically-driven
motivation – one tied up in race, racial dynamics, and the NBA’s
re-imaging campaign – seemingly plays a part as well. New York
Times columnist Harvey Araton writes in Crashing the Borders:
How Basketball Won the World and Lost Its Soul at Home:
Considering [Commissioner] Stern’s zest for marketing, given
the way many teams during the seventies and eighties stocked
the end of their benches with white players to ensure a
modicum of racial diversity, it [is not] unreasonable to
[hypothesize that] the accelerating internationalization . . . [is]
purely dollar-driven with a residual goal of loosening the
African-American hold on the league.289

Araton is not alone in his speculation. As noted above, New
York Times Columnist Bill Rhoden has asserted “the NBA
actively grooms as many non-black players as it can.”290 The
NBA’s increasing inclusion of European players, Rhoden suggests,
is a component of that grooming process: “European influence
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may be on the rise . . . [because] [t]here seems to be a taste for a
new flavor.”291 Further, many of the NBA’s players agree that
race may play into the league’s trend toward internationalization,
expressing concern that it reflects, perhaps, the league’s attempt to
“get whiter.”292
Even assuming the NBA does not intend that
internationalization spark a racial demographic shift in the league,
such a shift is destined to be internationalization’s by-product.
Professor Lapchick’s Institute for Diversity in Ethics and Sport
reports that 68% of the NBA’s international players are white and
only 32% are of color.293 In that nothing suggests the racial
composition of the NBA’s international player population is likely
to appreciably change,294 if that population continues to grow, as
all indications suggest it will, a racial demographic shift of some
sort is inevitable.
As discussed above, were MLS to permit internationalization
as the NBA has, it, too, would begin to experience a demographic
shift – but in the opposite direction. And just as the NBA
vigorously embraces internationalization, MLS staunchly restricts
it. Embracing internationalization and the demographic shift
naturally born of it, however, does not involve application of any
eligibility rule or standard. Rejecting internationalization so as to
prevent the demographic shift it portends, on the other hand, does.
So while it is difficult to imagine Title VII applying in the context
of the NBA’s seeming attempt to “get whiter” through
291
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internationalization, Title VII clearly applies to MLS’s
international eligibility rules which serve to disproportionately
exclude players of color.
VI. LESSONS ON LIGHTENING A LEAGUE: WHAT MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL STANDS TO LEARN FROM MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER
Taken together, the above analyses of the NFL, NHL, NBA,
and MLS suggest that the nature of internationalization’s
demographic impact explains, at least to some degree, the leagues’
regard or disregard for citizenship status. Where the disregard for
citizenship status is likely to increase the proportionality of white
players or preserve the status quo, citizenship status is unregulated.
Where such disregard would likely decrease the proportionality of
white players, as is the case with MLS, citizenship status is
regulated.
This pattern would suggest that MLB restricts the numbers of
its teams’ international players. After all, as is the case with MLS,
the overwhelming majority of MLB’s international players are of
color and hail primarily from Latin America and the Caribbean.295
While MLB does not currently impose international player
restrictions, an analysis of its changing demographics together with
the previously discussed racial politics long-existent in American
sport suggest, perhaps, it may soon choose to do so. Among the
MLS Policy’s dangers, therefore, is that it provides MLB a
discriminatory mechanism to emulate.
MLB, founded in 1903 through the merger of two previously
existent professional baseball leagues,296 openly banned blacks for
decades before beginning to desegregate during the middle of the
twentieth century.297 As opportunity for black players increased,
their numbers in MLB grew, and by 1975, 28% of MLB’s players
were black.298 Despite its increase in players of color, however,
there was little threat that MLB might become – as the NBA and
NFL were fast becoming – a league in which players of color
outnumbered white players. Indeed, shortly after reaching that
peak of 28%, the percentage of black major leaguers began a
295
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steady decline, with promising African American athletes opting in
greater numbers to play other sports, such as basketball and
football.299 As of 2007, the percentage of black baseball players in
MLB had plummeted to eight percent.300 Even if, however, when
the numbers of MLB players of color were rising precipitously,
MLB sought to slow that rise, citizenship discrimination would
have been ineffectual, as the great majority of MLB players of
color were African-American.301
During the 1990’s, MLB’s players of color once again began to
grow in percentage, and the trend has continued through the
present.302 This more recent increase, however, is fundamentally
different from the first, in that it is fueled by the incorporation into
the League of hundreds of foreign-born players.303 Dominicans,
Venezuelans, and nationals of other Latin American and Caribbean
countries appear in increasing numbers on MLB rosters.304
Notably, Latinos have played in MLB since the early twentieth
century305 and have maintained a presence since.306 In recent
299

Id. at 60-61, 79-80. Author and former MLB player Dave Winfield
explains that football and basketball “have siphoned away the interest of young
African American athletes” because they appear to offer a higher chance of
achieving wealth and fame than does baseball, they are more popular on the
college level than is baseball, and, at least in the case of basketball, pick-up
games require less equipment and fewer participants. Id. at 61-63.
300
WINFIELD, supra note 298, at 79. MLB has, in recent years, actively
sought to increase interest in baseball among black Americans and to, therefore,
eventually increase the ranks of black Major Leaguers through a variety of MLB
sponsored programs. Id. at 74.
301
Id. at 60-61.
302
See RICHARD LAPCHICK, THE 2008 RACIAL AND GENDER REPORT CARD:
MAJOR
LEAGUE
BASEBALL
16
(2008),
http://www.bus.ucf.edu/sport/public/downloads/2008_MLB_RGRC_PR.pdf
(last visited Feb. 1, 2009) (Whereas, in 1990, 70% of MLB players were white
and 30% were of color, in 2007, just under 60% of MLB players were white and
just over 40% were of color.).
303
Tyler M. Simpson, Balking at Responsibility: Baseball’s Performance
Enhancing Drug Problem in Latin America, 14 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 369, 37071
(2008);
Jessica
N.
Trotter, Rooting for the “Home Team”: How Major League Baseball and Latin
America Can Better Provide For The “Safe”-ty of Their Players, 13 SW. J. L. &
TRADE
AM.
445,
445-46 (2007).
304
Simpson, supra note 303, at 370-71.
305
The Latinos who played in MLB before it desegregated were, of course,
light-skinned Latinos. ADRIAN BURGOS, JR., PLAYING AMERICA’S GAME:
BASEBALL, LATINOS, AND THE COLOR LINE 245 (2007). While these pioneering
light-skinned Latinos were, unlike dark-skinned Latinos and blacks, permitted to
play, it bears noting that they were often disparagingly stereotyped and
discriminatorily remunerated. See Timothy Davis, Racism in Athletics: Subtle
Yet Persistent, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 881, 890-91 (1999),
306
BURGOS, supra note 305, at 245 (“Latino ‘invasions’ of the big leagues
have taken place approximately every generation.”).

57

years, however, numbers of Latin American players have steadily
increased and have reached unprecedented levels. Indeed, as of
2007, Latin American players accounted for nearly 30% of all
MLB players as compared with only 13% in 1990.307 MLB’s Latin
American players are not only numerous, they are also increasingly
dominant,308 and as such, they are, without question, changing the
face of Major League Baseball.309
All indications suggest this demographic shift will continue.
As numerous as are Latin American major league players, Latin
Americans make up an even greater proportion of MLB’s minor
league players – the players who will stock MLB rosters as current
MLB players become injured, experience declination in skills, or
retire.310
Indeed, over 40% of minor leaguers are Latin
American.311
This rising proportion of Latin Americans in minor league and
major league baseball is no fluke, but rather stems directly from
the economics of player recruitment. Put plainly, finding and
developing baseball players in Latin America is far cheaper than
doing so in the United States. As such, pursuant to what has been
dubbed the “boatload mentality,” all MLB teams recruit heavily in
Latin America.312 Because the manner in which MLB teams scout
Latin American prospects and the signing bonuses they give Latin
American prospects are far less stringently regulated than they
would be were the prospects American-born, “[t]he teams can buy
a boatload of players for the same amount of money it costs to sign
307
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one player born in the United States.”313 This allows MLB teams
to evaluate scores of players, most of whom will ultimately be
jettisoned, in hopes of identifying a few with the talent for major
league success.314 This system, although clearly exploitative,
persists.315 And if it further persists and the current demographic
trend continues, it is conceivable that black and brown players
whose primary language is Spanish will, within a few decades,
dominate the MLB landscape and that white players will become a
relative rarity.
If, however, the majority of paying baseball fans remain
white,316 and if scholars Ilyana Kuziemko and Geoffrey Rapp are
correct that “the market for Major League Baseball players is
characterized by customer discrimination,”317 some MLB teams
313
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may, at some point, choose to decelerate their Latin American
recruiting mechanisms, so as to maintain a critical mass of white
players on their major league teams.318 It is also possible that
MLB, as a whole, could seek to stem the tide of Latin American
entrants into its ranks. Even now, whispers circulate in the
baseball community of several MLB teams, being “too Latin.”319
If, indeed, MLB leadership chooses to reverse the League’s
darkening trend, MLS-like citizenship discrimination would be an
ideal means of doing so. Through citizenship discrimination, MLB
could limit each team’s number of international players – players
who are overwhelmingly of color – to ensure roster positions for
domestic players, who are majority white. No matter the skill of
the international players, their MLB opportunities would be
artificially capped and their numbers would reduce.
While the thought of an American professional sport’s
organizing body taking affirmative steps to reduce a racial group’s
presence in the sport may, at first blush, seem fantastical, it is well
historically precedented. Consider, for instance, the sport of horse
racing, in which “African-Americans make up just a fraction of the
riding community.”320 When horse racing was at its most popular,
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the great
majority of jockeys were black.321 Over the course of a twentyyear span, however, exclusionary practices served to drastically
reduce their numbers.322 While horse racing without black jockeys
was inconceivable at one time, the horse-racing industry’s
development of discriminatory licensing requirements together
with horse owners’ concerns about blacks dominating the jockey
ranks served to systematically alter the horse racing landscape such
that horse races involving no black jockeys eventually became the
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norm.323 Indeed, a glance at horse racing in the twenty-first
century scarcely reveals that blacks were ever meaningfully
involved in the sport.324
Competitive bicycling has endured a similar phenomenon.
During the early twentieth century when cycling was a spectator
sport sparking “epidemic” interest among Americans across the
nation, blacks were heavily involved and, indeed, were among the
sport’s most successful cyclists.325 Blacks’ opportunities in the
sport were, however, discriminatorily limited when, at the height
of the sport’s popularity, the League of American Wheelmen, the
then-premier national cycling membership association, passed a
motion prohibiting the admission of new black members.326 While
blacks already in the organization were not stripped of their
memberships, the exclusionary rule sent a clear message as to the
value the American cycling community placed on black cyclists,
and black cyclists quickly became novelties.327
The context in which rule changes thwarted the development of
black jockeys and cyclists was obviously quite different from the
context in which this article suggests MLB could conceivably
shrink the ranks of Latino baseball players. Indeed, the former
context was characterized by far more virulent and overt racial
animus and discrimination than the latter. Still, the two factors
enabling systematic exclusion in horse racing and cycling a
century ago exist in baseball today: 1) the motive to discriminate;
and 2) a means of doing so. Assuming MLB and its teams are
sufficiently motivated to decrease the Latin influence on the
league, the MLS policy provides an archetype for a Title VII endaround: racial discrimination by way of lawful citizenship
discrimination. Title VII cannot tolerate such an end-around. The
MLS Policy, therefore, demands scrutiny not only because of its
discriminatory impact in the MLS context, but because of its
broader implications.
VII. CONCLUSION
Over fifty years ago, during the mid-twentieth century,
American sport matured mightily. One by one, America’s premier
professional sports leagues abandoned policies excluding players
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of color from participation, and, as time has passed, the numbers of
people of color playing sport professionally in the United States
has increased significantly.
While some teams in the NBA, the NHL, the NFL, and MLB
may continue to subtly discriminate in constructing their rosters,328
they do so in spite of league mandate. In the MLS context,
however, teams may discriminate in constructing their rosters
pursuant to league mandate.
Because of its demographic
dynamics, MLS, through imposing on each of its teams an
international player quota, artificially suppresses the numbers of
players of color in the League. Whether it does so intentionally or
unintentionally, MLS is vulnerable to Title VII challenge and, if
sued, would face potential liability.
The MLS Policy is certainly concerning in its own right, but its
implications for the broader American professional sporting
community spur still greater concern. Internationalization in the
NBA, the NHL, and the NFL either increases the proportion of
white players in those leagues or maintains the demographic status
quo, and, predictably, those leagues allow – and in some cases
encourage – international player participation.
MLB’s
demographic dynamics, however, are similar to MLS’, and as
such, MLB’s continued internationalization will decrease, rather
than increase, the proportion of white MLB players. The MLS
Policy, therefore, provides a convenient template for MLB should
MLB seek to halt or reverse its demographic trend. This article
argues, however, that the MLS Policy may well contravene Title
VII’s racial discrimination prohibition. It therefore demands,
rather than emulation, searching scrutiny and, perhaps,
invalidation.
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